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Abstract 
This dissertation titled “International Energy Markets – Empirical Investigations” cov-
ers three peer-reviewed publications in international journals (plus additionally three 
conference proceedings / presentations and one book chapter) which are guided by 
the common frame of energy markets and empirical methods. The individual papers 
can be related to the top-three energy policy objectives of the European Union. 
 
The first paper deals with the impacts of daily green electricity production forecasting 
and 7-day-trading on the Austrian electricity market. The applied methods include an 
empirical survey, a natural experiment evaluation and an econometric analysis. This 
paper connects to the European Union’s goal of fighting against global warming and 
fostering green electricity production. 
 
The second paper investigates the energy supply security of the European Union in 
the wake of Russian dominance of the gas supplies of the European Union. The de-
mand for the Nabucco Gas Pipeline project is surveyed and the favorability of the 
Nabucco Gas Pipeline project versus other pipeline projects is evaluated. An empiri-
cal survey is carried out and econometric analysis is applied. This paper follows the 
European Union’s search for energy supply security and diversification of imported 
energy sources. 
 
The third paper analyses the optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation 
capacity. A combination of three research methods is applied: mathematical formula-
tion, experimental testing, and empirical auction surveying. This paper – building on 
the enormous attention that auction theory has attracted in recent years leading to 
the award of Nobel Prices in Economics – accompanies the European Union’s 
search for competitive energy markets and market mechanisms. 
 
In addition, for the further dissemination of knowledge, these papers were also pre-
sented at international research conferences. An extra book chapter contribution (see 
Annex) further demonstrates the author’s research ambitions. 
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1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter is to provide the reader with a short overview of this disser-
tation titled “International Energy Markets – Empirical Investigations” and to put its 
three parts in context to each other.  
This dissertation is concerned with the analysis of natural happenings on interna-
tional energy markets (i.e. 7-day-trading on electricity exchanges; security of supply 
concerns and evaluation on a European Union level; auctioning of gas transportation 
capacities) and the application of empirical methods (i.e. surveying; experimentation; 
econometric analysis) to investigate these natural happenings. Written in a cumula-
tive approach, it covers three peer-reviewed publications in international journals that 
are guided by the common frame of energy markets and empirical methods. As such 
it is divided into three parts; each forms a separate paper. The papers can be related 
to the top-three energy policy objectives of the European Union (Percebois, 2008). 
The first paper deals with the impacts of daily green electricity production forecasting 
and 7-day-trading on the Austrian electricity market. The applied methods include an 
empirical survey, a natural experiment evaluation and an econometric analysis. This 
paper connects to the European Union’s goal of fighting against global warming and 
fostering green electricity production. 
The second paper investigates the energy supply security of the European Union in 
the wake of Russian dominance of the gas supplies of the European Union. The de-
mand for the Nabucco Gas Pipeline project is surveyed and the favorability of the 
Nabucco Gas Pipeline project versus other pipeline projects is evaluated. An empiri-
cal survey is carried out and econometric analysis is applied. This paper follows the 
European Union’s search for energy supply security and diversification of imported 
energy sources. 
The third paper analyses the optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation 
capacity. A combination of three research methods is applied: mathematical formula-
tion, experimental testing, and empirical auction surveying. This paper – building on 
the enormous attention that auction theory has attracted in recent years leading to 
the award of Nobel Prices in Economics – accompanies the European Union’s 
search for competitive energy markets and market mechanisms. 
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In addition, for the further dissemination of knowledge, these papers were also pre-
sented at international research conferences. An extra book chapter contribution (see 
Annex) further demonstrates the author’s research ambitions. 
These publications are governed by a common frame as further depicted in the next 
Section. 
1.1. Common Frame 
This dissertation covers three peer-reviewed publications in international journals 
(plus additionally three conference proceedings / presentations and one book chap-
ter) that are guided by the common frame of i) energy markets and ii) empirical 
methods. Moreover as a third cornerstone this work focuses on iii) energy ex-
changes, auctions and trading.  
Figure 1 below depicts this ”Three Publications under One Common Frame“-
Approach graphically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Introducing this Dissertation – Three Publications under One Common Frame 
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1.2. Objective – Three Publications 
The objective of this dissertation was to produce three publishable papers and thus 
to contribute to empirical knowledgebase and theory in the area of energy manage-
ment. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the three publications and their values according to the 
PhD-guidelines for cumulative dissertations (PhD-Guidelines, 2008). The ranking 
marked with * corresponds to the applicable VHB Jourqual 1 ranking (VHB Jourqual 
1 Ranking, 2010). The weighted points marked with ** represent the factor-weighted 
points when considering contributions of co-authors according to the PhD-guidelines 
for cumulative dissertations (PhD-Guidelines, 2008). It shall be noted that the third 
paper is at the date of submission of this dissertation under second stage review by 
an International Journal. According to the PhD-guidelines for cumulative dissertations 
(PhD-Guidelines, 2008) the PhD-reviewers can especially evaluate the value of pa-
pers that have not yet been published. This third paper has furthermore been pre-
sented at a peer-reviewed conference and was also presented and graded positively 
in the course of the PhD Forschungsseminar (see PhD Grades in the Annex). 
The sum of all weighted points of 3.75 marked with *** highlights that the require-
ments for a PhD dissertation – 3.00 points according to the PhD-guidelines for cumu-
lative dissertations (PhD-Guidelines, 2008) – are more than fulfilled. Even more so 
since according to the Habilitation-guidelines of the University of Vienna (Habilitation-
Guidelines, 2010) conference proceedings – for the further dissemination of knowl-
edge papers were also presented at international research conferences – would de-
serve additional points. Similarly, and again referring to the Habilitation-guidelines of 
the University of Vienna (Habilitation-Guidelines, 2010) that mentions monographs, 
the extra book chapter contribution (see Annex) could provide further points. 
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Figure 2: Overview of Publications and their Value according to the PhD-Guidelines 
In the following subsections a brief overview of the three main Chapters of this dis-
sertation will be given. 
1.3. Paper 1 Summary 
The first paper titled “The Impact of Introduction Seven-Day-Trading on the Austrian 
Electricity Market” was published in the “Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft” in          
Quarter 4 / 2009 and presented at the 10th IAEE European Energy Conference in 
Vienna / Austria in September 2009. 
This paper analyses the impacts of the new daily green electricity production fore-
casting policy by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) and the 
newly introduced seven-day electricity trading mechanism by the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) on the Austrian electricity market.  
By treating these two market policy alterations as natural experiments and applying 
statistical and econometric methods to a unique data set, it is investigated whether 
thereby (i) a reduction of the green electricity production forecasting uncertainties 
and (ii) a generally more efficient electricity market with accompanying lower net 
costs is attained. Furthermore, we analyse whether (iii) seven-day-trading helps to 
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mitigate the Friday-Monday effect that is often observed on stock and other ex-
changes markets. Finally, we investigate whether or not (iv) the underlying market 
design might tempt OEMAG to systematically overstate its forecasts on green power 
generation.  
Results show that this new market design reduces forecasting uncertainties and also 
lowers costs of electricity balancing, at least when not taking into account additional 
costs (e.g. personnel) to administer the trading on the incremental days. Friday-
Monday effects are somewhat mitigated, thus decreasing volatility on power ex-
changes. The Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency systematically understate 
its forecasts on green power generation versus actual green power production. 
1.4. Paper 2 Summary 
The second paper “Enhancing the EU’s Energy Supply Security: An Evaluation of the 
Nabucco Project” was published in the “Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft” in          
Quarter 3 / 2010 and presented at the 33rd IAEE International Energy Conference in 
Rio de Janeiro / Brazil in June 2010. 
The Russian dominance of the European Union (EU)’s natural gas supplies has put 
the independence of the EU at risk. This paper presents an evaluation of the 
Nabucco gas pipeline project – considered by some to be the most economical link to 
new natural gas sources – to determine whether it would help the EU to diversify its 
gas supplies in a cost-effective way, thus improving its energy supply security in fu-
ture years. Furthermore, an introduction to the Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allo-
cation Process is given. 
Applying empirical methods and competitive pipeline benchmarking analysis, three 
hypotheses related to the Nabucco natural experiment are evaluated: while hypothe-
sis (1) focuses on the strength of demand for the Nabucco pipeline transportation 
capacities, hypotheses (2) and (3) examine fair usage rights and overall cost effec-
tiveness of this project. Empirical results show that, due to the EU’s increasing long-
term gas demand and decreasing indigenous production, there is a strong demand 
for the Nabucco gas pipeline by gas shippers. Furthermore, the empirical survey re-
veals that Nabucco provides a fair capacity allocation of fifty percent to third party 
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shippers. Finally, competitive benchmarking shows Nabucco is indeed a cost-
effective new pipeline and a link to fresh natural gas sources for Europe.  
Based on these results, it is anticipated  that “Nabucco” will not only remain the name 
of a famous opera, but will also become the term associated with one of the most 
successful energy projects in Europe. 
1.5. Paper 3 Summary 
The third paper “Auction Design for Gas Pipeline Transportation Capacity – The 
Case of Nabucco” is at the time of submission of this dissertation under second stage 
review by an International Journal and was presented at the 11th IAEE European En-
ergy Conference in Vilnius / Lithuania in August 2010. 
As a response to the Russian dominance of the European Union’s (EU’s) natural gas 
supplies and the combination of the EU’s increasing gas demands and decreasing 
indigenous gas production, major gas pipeline projects are currently under way in 
order to enhance the security of the EU’s energy supply. Oftentimes to raise financ-
ing and to allocate gas transportation capacities special forms of auctions are carried 
out to allow gas shippers to make firm bookings.  
In recent years, auctions have emerged as one of the most successful allocation 
mechanisms in microeconomic theory. However, different auction design allocation 
mechanisms can lead to different outcomes making the choice of auction design a 
decisive one, especially for divisible-good auctions. This paper seeks to give a formu-
lation of an optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. Specifi-
cally three different allocation mechanism designs are tested: (i) Biggest Net Present 
Value Contract Allocation; (ii) Pro Rata Allocation; and (iii) Allocation per Optimiza-
tion. In addition, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project is taken as a case study to ex-
perimentally and empirically show the results of such auction designs. 
Results show that a trade-off between revenue optimization and fair and transparent 
allocation can be observed: Allocation per Optimization is the favourable auction de-
sign when revenue maximization is more important than fair and transparent alloca-
tion. On the other hand, Pro Rata Allocation is the auction design to be chosen when 
fairness and transparency of allocation are considered most central. 
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1.6. Structure 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the full paper 
titled “The Impact of Introduction Seven-Day-Trading on the Austrian Electricity Mar-
ket”. Next, Section 3 covers the paper “Enhancing the EU’s Energy Supply Security: 
An Evaluation of the Nabucco Project”. Finally, Section 4 features the paper “Auction 
Design for Gas Pipeline Transportation Capacity – The Case of Nabucco”. Implica-
tions for theory and practice are highlighted in the specific paper Sections 2, 3 and 4. 
Equally limitations and directions for future research are highlighted in these specific 
paper sections. Section 5 provides literature references. In Section 6 Annexes are 
included to provide for a summary of this dissertation in German language and to 
present a brief curriculum vitae of the author. Furthermore this Section 6 includes the 
author’s additional book chapter contribution, research conference proceedings / cer-
tificates and organizational items like the PhD Expose and PhD Grades. 
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2. Paper 1 – The Impact of Introduction Seven-Day-
Trading on the Austrian Electricity Market 
This Paper has been published in the “Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft” (Wiesbaden / 
Germany) in Quarter 4 / 2009 and presented at the 10th IAEE European Energy Con-
ference (International Association of Energy Economics, Policies and Technologies 
for Sustainable Economics) in Vienna / Austria in September 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthias Pickl | International Energy Markets – Empirical Investigations | 9 | 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the impacts of the new daily green electricity production fore-
casting policy by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) and the 
newly introduced seven-day electricity trading mechanism by the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) on the Austrian electricity market.  
By treating these two market policy alterations as natural experiments and applying 
statistical and econometric methods to a unique data set, it is investigated whether 
thereby (i) a reduction of the green electricity production forecasting uncertainties 
and (ii) a generally more efficient electricity market with accompanying lower net 
costs is attained. Furthermore, we analyse whether (iii) seven-day-trading helps to 
mitigate the Friday-Monday effect that is often observed on stock and other ex-
changes markets. Finally, we investigate whether or not (iv) the underlying market 
design might tempt OEMAG to systematically overstate its forecasts on green power 
generation.  
Results show that this new market design reduces forecasting uncertainties and also 
lowers costs of electricity balancing, at least when not taking into account additional 
costs (e.g. personnel) to administer the trading on the incremental days. Friday-
Monday effects are somewhat mitigated, thus decreasing volatility on power ex-
changes. The Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency systematically understate 
its forecasts on green power generation versus actual green power production. 
2.1. Introduction and Motivation 
The Friday-Monday effect in stock exchange markets is a well documented phe-
nomenon linked to the interruption of the usual flow of information during weekends 
(Fama, 1965 & 1970; French, 1980; Gibbons & Hess, 1981; Keim & Stambaugh, 
1984; Linn & Lockwood, 1988; Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988; Bessembinder and 
Hertzel, 1993; Jaffe & Westerfield, 1985; Chang & Pinegar & Ravichandran, 1993; 
Tong, 2000; Pettengill, 2003; Hirshleifer, 2001; Shiller, 2003) and has been further 
empirically shown for other asset classes (Gibbons & Hess, 1981; Flannery & Proto-
papadakis, 1988; Griffith & Winters, 1995) as well as for commodity (Ball & Torous & 
Tschögl, 1982; Ma, 1986) and electricity markets (Higgs & Worthington, 2005). In the 
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case of electricity markets this information break is of particular concern for day 
ahead trading auctions. The reasons are that weather forecasts become increasingly 
unreliable with the forecast horizon (three days on any Friday in a five-days trading 
regime) but are crucial to predict demand and even more crucial to forecast renew-
able productions like wind energy (Sinden, 2007). 
In the beginning of October 2008 the seven-day electricity trading mechanism was 
introduced on the European Energy Exchange (EEX Announcement, 2008) to create 
a more efficient continuous market that offers trading participants the possibility of 
improving portfolio optimization. Previously power trading on the EEX’s spot market 
took place from Monday to Friday only and on Friday trading was carried out for the 
delivery days Saturday, Sunday and Monday (EEX Customer Information, 2007). 
While the much smaller Austrian Power Exchange EXAA still holds on to the Monday 
to Friday trading mechanism (Austrian Power Exchange, 2009), the decision of the 
German EEX - on which de facto all Austrian electricity trading companies are ac-
tive1 - in favour of a seven day auction for spot market electricity for the first time 
creates a sufficiently liquid trading platform also for weekends. Thus an important 
pre-condition for any electricity market to function effectively by establishing a con-
tinuous spot market as well as a market for future delivery periods has been fulfilled 
(McDermott & Peterson, 2002). 
Simultaneously in October 2008 the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency 
(OEMAG, 2009) decided to allocate green electricity production forecasts on a daily 
basis. This step was taken to reduce prediction uncertainties and in response to the 
growing wind power share, that especially with increasing lead times – e.g. forecast-
ing Sunday’s wind on Friday rather than on the same day – is difficult to predict ow-
ing to its natural intermittency and limited predictability (Vandezande et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, this should lead to a more efficient electricity market with lower costs, in 
particular for balancing energy.  
OEMAG allocates two types of renewable power produced i) in small hydro power 
plants and from ii) other renewable resources to all Austrian electricity suppliers. The 
amount allocated to each supplier corresponds to the suppliers’ share in total con-
sumption three months ago. OEMAG assigns green power at different allocation tar-
                                                
1 EEX trades in APG grid possible, and, there are no capacity restrictions between Germany and 
Austria 
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iffs for small hydro and other renewables. These tariffs are annually adjusted by the 
Austrian regulatory commission E-Control (E-Control, 2009). 
This institutional change provides a unique real world experiment how continuous 
trading enhances the efficiency of markets, specifically of electricity markets. Natural 
experiments (Meyer, 1995; Wu & Lampietti & Meyer, 2004; Asche & Osmundsen & 
Sandsmark, 2006; Douglas, 2006; Florio, 2007; Bellas & Lange, 2008) are a wide-
spread research method where artificial laboratory controlled experimentation is diffi-
cult to be carried out. Of course these efficiency gains must be weighed against the 
costs of setting up and running trading all seven days. More precisely, this paper 
analyses the impacts of the new daily green electricity production forecasting policy 
by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) and the newly intro-
duced seven-day electricity trading mechanism by the European Energy Exchange 
(EEX) on the Austrian electricity market. Specifically, it is investigated whether 
thereby (i) a reduction of the green electricity production forecasting uncertainties 
and (ii) a generally more efficient electricity market with accompanying lower costs 
can be attained. It is determined whether the newly introduced seven-day electricity 
trading mechanism is aiding in making electricity on the whole more affordable. In 
addition, we analyse whether (iii) seven-day-trading helps to mitigate the often ob-
served Monday effects on exchanges. Finally, we investigate whether or not (iv) the 
underlying market design might tempt OEMAG to systematically overstate its fore-
casts on green power generation, because its remuneration exceeds the costs of 
buying any shortfall in the market. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview and reasoning of the 
hypotheses that we wish to examine. Next, section 3 describes the applied research 
methodology. In section 4 results are presented and discussed. A conclusion is pro-
vided in Section 5. 
2.2. Hypotheses 
This paper seeks to investigate four major hypotheses about the impact of the newly 
introduced seven-day electricity trading mechanism and daily green electricity pro-
duction forecasting policy on the Austrian electricity market. 
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This paper examines whether the “seven-day per week” green electricity allocation 
by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) indeed results in a 
reduction of the renewable production forecasting uncertainties. Figure 1 below 
shows the quarter-hourly renewable power production (small hydro power and other 
renewables, including wind) in the control area Austrian Power Grid (APG) from Oc-
tober 2008 to March 2009 in megawatt hours. As can be seen this renewable power 
production exhibits strong volatility (mean: 582 MW; standard deviation: 244 MW; 
minimum: 263 MW; maximum 1,190 MW that was recently rising due to the growing 
wind power generation share (Jacob, 2008; Ladenburg, 2008; Bolinger & Wiser, 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Renewable Power Production in the Control Area APG, Oct. 2008 - March 2009 (Quarter-
hourly values in MW, data used with permission) 
Since forecasting should get easier with shorter lead times (Roulston et al., 2003) – 
e.g. forecasting Monday’s wind energy on the previous day rather than beforehand 
on Friday – a reduction of the renewable production forecasting uncertainties can be 
expected from this change in market settings from a logical point of view. Hence, the 
first hypothesis claims this formally:  
Hypothesis 1: The “seven-day per week” green electricity allocation reduces forecast-
ing uncertainties versus the “five-day per week” green electricity alloca-
tion. 
Second, we investigate whether the seven-day electricity trading mechanism brings 
about a generally more efficient electricity market with accompanying lower costs. In 
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principle, improved forecast accuracy should reduce the variance of uncovered mar-
ket positions. Up to now the liberalization of the electricity sector in Europe has often 
been accused to be responsible for a trend, which materialized in the opposite way of 
what was expected and hoped for by policy makers and consumers: increasing elec-
tricity prices (Percebois, 2008). The main interest of market participants in a liberal-
ized electricity market is, however, to minimize balancing electricity and the costs 
associated with it. And this is exactly the aim of the seven-day electricity trading 
mechanism: to lower the costs of balancing electricity. Whether this is actually the 
case remains to be proven. Therefore, the following second hypothesis can be for-
mulated: 
Hypothesis 2: The “seven-day per week” trading mechanism lowers balancing costs.  
Third, this paper analyses whether the closed-market, weekend or Monday effect as 
observed and well-documented on various types of exchange markets (for refer-
ences see section 1), can be reduced by the introduction of the seven-day-trading 
mechanism. Following the calendar time hypothesis (Fama, 1965; French, 1980) the 
exchange process operates continuously and the expected return for Mondays or 
other days following holidays should therefore be different from the distribution of re-
turns for other normal days of the week. In the case of electricity exchanges the im-
possibility to store energy means that it has to be generated and consumed in real 
time (Glachant & Saguan, 2007) with imbalances leading to higher price volatility. By 
analysing the volume of balancing energy on Mondays in a seven-day-trading 
mechanism versus a five-day-trading setting, it shall be investigated whether a reduc-
tion in the Monday effect can be determined. In positive expectations the third hy-
pothesis claims: 
Hypothesis 3: Seven-day-trading helps to mitigate the Friday-Monday effect on en-
ergy exchanges. 
Finally, we investigate whether or not the new underlying market design might tempt 
the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) to systematically exag-
gerate its forecasts on green power generation, because its remuneration might ex-
ceed the costs payable for any shortfall in balancing energy.  
More principally all available announced green power will be used and refunded at 
the fixed feed in tariff. Any shortfall must be bought on the balancing market. Since 
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the feed in tariff is much higher than the cost for balancing energy, firms have an in-
centive to provide systematically too optimistic projections on the availability of green 
electricity. Thus it is analysed whether the new seven-day-trading market design cre-
ates an incentive problem. The forth hypothesis states that this is the case. 
Hypothesis 4: The underlying market design tempts OEMAG to overestimate its fore-
casts on green power generation. 
2.3. Method 
The decisions to trade electricity and allocate green electricity production daily from 
Monday to Sunday, rather than only from Monday to Friday serve as an excellent 
natural experiment (Meyer, 1995) that allows us to analyse the impacts of an exoge-
nous variation in market settings on the Austrian renewable electricity market. That 
is, as has become popular in energy research (Wu & Lampietti & Meyer, 2004; Asche 
& Osmundsen & Sandsmark, 2006; Douglas, 2006; Florio, 2007; Bellas & Lange, 
2008), some kind of event study is applied.  
The analysis is performed by applying statistical and econometric methods in SPSS 
(2005) to a unique data set containing time series of green power allocation from 
“other renewables” (not “small hydro”) balancing deviation and balancing prices in the 
APG control area of eastern Austria (data used with permission). Additionally, we use 
data from the European Energy Exchange (2008) to analyse electricity prices (data 
used with permission). The period analysed comprises the six months from October 
2008 to March 2009.  
2.4. Results 
Results concerning the first hypothesis confirm the expected outcomes: The “seven-
day per week” green electricity allocation tends to reduce forecasting uncertainties 
versus the “five-day per week” green electricity allocation since lead times are short-
ened. Figure 2 and Table 1 below illustrate that in all six months analysed the 
“seven-day per week” forecast (i.e. V2) fares better than the “five-day per week” fore-
cast (i.e. V1) both when counting occurrences and comparing means of absolute de-
viations. Overall, in 68% of all quarter-hourly forecasts the “seven-day per week” 
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forecast (V2) comes closer to the actual total renewable energy production than V1. 
Also, in all months the means of absolute differences are lower for the “seven-day 
per week” forecast (V2). Table 1, comparing the mean deviations shows that, on av-
erage, the V2 Forecast (Sunday to Monday) is 26.27% better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Descriptive Comparison: Percentage of Quarter-Hourly-Forecasts when “seven-day per 
week” forecasts (V2) are better than “five-day per week” forecasts (V1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Comparison of Mean Absolute Differences between “five-day per week” forecasts 
(V1) and Actual vs. “seven-day per week” forecasts (V2) and Actual 
Finally, as forecasting differences / errors are broadly normally distributed, a paired 
two sample t-test shall evaluate whether the null hypothesis of equal mean differ-
ences between “five-day per week” forecasts (V1) and “seven-day per week” fore-
casts (V2) can be rejected. A paired test is chosen as the forecasts are not inde-
pendent from each other. The resulting p-value in Table 2 below point out that there 
is a statistically significant difference between the absolute mean differences of the 
“five-day per week” forecasts (V1) and the “seven-day per week” forecasts (V2) at the 
0.01 level. Thus, we can conclude that “seven-day per week” green electricity alloca-
tion indeed reduces forecasting uncertainties. These results replicate previous find-
ings of Roulston et al. (2003). 
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Table 2: Results of a Paired Two Sample t-Test for equal means (with SPSS (2005))  
The second hypothesis deals with the question of whether “seven-day per week” 
green electricity allocation lower balancing electricity costs. To evaluate this question 
the following cost function is applied:  
Cost (V(i)) = Σ(Ebal(i) * pbal) – Esh*psh –Eoth(i)*poth + Cost fix     (1)  
Ebal(i) –Eoth(i)  = const.         (2) 
i =1 … five-day per week; i=2 … seven-day per week 
Ebal  = balancing energy 
p = prices 
sh = small hydro 
oth = other renewables 
 Constraint: Balancing prices pbal are not influenced by green electricity allocation  (3) 
The cost function (1) is made up by balancing energy costs (monthly sum of the 
product of ¼-hourly balancing power Ebal and respective balancing energy prices pbal) 
minus earnings from assigned green electricity (small hydro and other renewables, 
each per volume E and allocation tariff p) plus a constant fixed costs term covering 
all operational costs.  
The variable parts are marked in bold letters. To elevate the forecast implies to in-
crease green power allocation Eoth, and, in turn, to increase the amount of balancing 
energy Ebal. This interrelation is expressed in equation (2). 
We then compare the cost of V1 with V2 in order to evaluate the impact of the differ-
ent trading schemes on balancing costs. 
Figure 3 underneath demonstrates that in three out of six months the net differential 
costs of balancing electricity are higher under the old regime of V1 Forecasts (Friday 
to Monday) than under V2 Forecasts (Sunday to Monday). These results are signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level. The results show a slight tendency towards decreasing costs, 
especially in March 2009.  
Furthermore, the total average monthly net cost of electricity balancing is lower when 
utilizing a V2 forecast (Sunday to Monday) mechanism. 
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Figure 3: Descriptive Comparison Cost of Balancing Electricity under V1 (Friday to Monday) Forecast 
vs. V2 (Sunday to Monday) Forecast 
Results with reference to the third hypothesis – i.e. seven-day-trading helps to miti-
gate the Friday-Monday effect - tend to confirm the expected outcome. To come to 
this result we investigated whether the average volume of balancing energy on Mon-
days is reduced when seven-day-trading is present compared to one year ago and 
two years ago when trading was carried out only on a five-days-per-week basis. Fig-
ure 4 below illustrates that the volume of balancing energy on Mondays in the seven-
day-trading period October 2008 to March 2009 on average amounts to 23.650,88 
kWh and is thus indeed lower than the average balancing energy volumes of previ-
ous years (October 2006 to March 2007: 24.358,11; October 2007 to March 2008: 
24.121,39) when five-day-trading was followed. Table 3 gives more details into the 
month by month comparisons. 
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Figure 4: Descriptive Comparison of Balancing Energy Volume (in kWh), October 2006 to March 2007 
vs. October 2007 to March 2008 vs. October 2008 vs. March 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Comparison of Balancing Energy Volume (in kWh), October 2006 to March 2007 
vs. October 2007 to March 2008 vs. October 2008 to March 2009, Details 
Next, to determine statistical significance of the descriptive results a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is consulted as the population is not normally distributed (Corder & 
Foreman, 2009). The obtained p-values in Table 4 indicate that, in contrast to the 
descriptive statistics that show that volumes of balancing energy on Mondays in a 
seven-day-trading regime are lower than in a five-day trading mechanism, results are 
not statistically significant at the 0.10 level. While October 2006 to March 2007 ver-
sus October 2008 to March 2009 comparison at least comes somewhat close to sig-
nificance, October 2007 to March 2008 versus October 2008 to March 2009 com-
parison does not. Consequently, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal means 
of balancing volumes. The descriptive results, on the other hand point at a mitigation 
of the Monday effect due to seven-day-trading and therefore reduced weekend vola-
tility on power exchanges. 
 
 
Table 4: Results of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (with SPSS (2005))  
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Finally, we turn to the evaluation of hypothesis four that claims that the underlying 
new market design tempts the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OE-
MAG) to systematically forecast higher generation volumes because its remuneration 
exceeds the costs payable for any shortfall in terms of balancing energy. Rather than 
looking at the absolute forecast errors as under the first hypothesis, this is done by 
analyzing whether individual quarter-hourly negative and positive forecasts cancel 
each other out over the observation period. If so, than no tendency for too positive or 
too negative forecasting can be determined. On the other hand, if mean differences 
of forecasts are significantly different from 0, than a general tendency for too positive 
(or too negative) forecasting of green power generation volumes is present.  
Figure 5 below indicates that in the period October 2008 to March 2009 there was a 
surprising tendency to underestimate green power generation volumes. While in Oc-
tober 2008 and in January 2009 there was a propensity of slightly exaggerated fore-
casts, in four out of six months (i.e. November 2008, December 2008, February 
2009, and March 2009) the forecasts for green power generation by far underesti-
mated the actual green power occurrences. In total it can be seen that over the ob-
servation period a negative bias of 37,51 MW is present for V1 Forecasts (Friday to 
Monday). This negative bias with 31,69 MW on average is slightly narrowed down for 
V2 Forecasts (Sunday to Monday). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Descriptive Comparison of Individual Average monthly Forecasting Errors (in MW) 
Statistical significance of this overall negative bias is tested with a one sample t-test 
for means (forecasting differences / errors are broadly normally distributed) to deter-
mine whether mean forecasting errors are significantly different from 0. Table 5 and 6 
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show that both the means V1 Forecasts (Friday to Monday) as well as the V2 Fore-
casts (Sunday to Monday) are statistically negatively different from 0 mean forecast-
ing errors at the 0.01 level. The result, V2 > V1, supports our hypothesis that OE-
MAG might increase its forecasts on days affected by "seven-days per week" trading. 
But, surprisingly and also in contraction to our expectation, it generally underesti-
mates green power generation volumes. Maybe this is an inheritance from the former 
green certificates mechanism, when OEMAGs predecessor "Ökostrom Bilanzgruppe" 
was eager to avoid being short in terms of certificates. 
 
 
Table 5: Results of a One Sample t-Test for equal means, V1 Forecasts (Friday to Monday) vs. 0 
mean forecasting errors 
 
 
Table 6: Results of a One Sample t-Test for equal means, V2 Forecasts (Sunday to Monday) vs. 0 
mean forecasting errors 
2.5. Conclusion 
This paper analysed the impacts of two electricity market policy alterations - the new 
daily green electricity production forecasting policy by the Austrian Green Electricity 
Settlement Agency (OEMAG) and the newly introduced seven-day electricity trading 
mechanism by the European Energy Exchange (EEX) - on the Austrian electricity 
market. Four main research hypotheses were posed centering around the question of 
how continuous trading and continuous forecasting enhances the efficiency of elec-
tricity markets. In conclusion the new market mechanisms seem to improve availabil-
ity of renewable electricity (and presumably also demand) which should make the 
market more efficient. At least three of the four hypothesis results point into that di-
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rection. Firstly, results show that the new market design reduces forecasting uncer-
tainties by 26.27% (highly significant) and, secondly, on average also lowers costs of 
electricity balancing (highly significant). Whether this improved efficiency is covering 
the incremental costs of seven- instead of five-day trading and whether smaller en-
ergy exchanges, like the Austrian EXAA, are likely to make the same move remains 
to be investigated. Furthermore, seven-day trading seems to have a positive effect 
(even if not statistically significant) on mitigating the Friday-Monday effects on energy 
exchanges, thus decreasing price volatility on power exchanges. Lastly, the new 
market design makes the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency systemati-
cally understate its forecasts on green power generation (highly significant) versus 
actual green power production. However, even here the new market design narrowed 
downed the negative forecasting tendency when compared to the results of the pre-
vious market mechanism. 
In further research the arrival of seven-day trading shall be analyses on different po-
wer exchanges and the impact thereof on different countries in order to determine 
whether the results of this paper can be repeated in other markets as well. 
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3. Paper 2 – Enhancing the EU’s Energy Supply Se-
curity: An Evaluation of the Nabucco Project 
This Paper has been published in the “Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft” (Wiesbaden / 
Germany) in Quarter 3 / 2010 and presented at the 33rd IAEE International Energy 
Conference (International Association of Energy Economics, The Future of Energy: 
Global Challenges, Diverse Solutions) in Rio de Janeiro / Brazil in June 2010. 
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Abstract 
The Russian dominance of the European Union (EU)’s natural gas supplies has put 
the independence of the EU at risk. This paper presents an evaluation of the 
Nabucco gas pipeline project – considered by some to be the most economical link to 
new natural gas sources – to determine whether it would help the EU to diversify its 
gas supplies in a cost-effective way, thus improving its energy supply security in fu-
ture years. Furthermore, an introduction to the Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allo-
cation Process is given. 
Applying empirical methods and competitive pipeline benchmarking analysis, three 
hypotheses related to the Nabucco natural experiment are evaluated: while hypothe-
sis (1) focuses on the strength of demand for the Nabucco pipeline transportation 
capacities, hypotheses (2) and (3) examine fair usage rights and overall cost effec-
tiveness of this project. Empirical results show that, due to the EU’s increasing long-
term gas demand and decreasing indigenous production, there is a strong demand 
for the Nabucco gas pipeline by gas shippers. Furthermore, the empirical survey re-
veals that Nabucco provides a fair capacity allocation of fifty percent to third party 
shippers. Finally, competitive benchmarking shows Nabucco is indeed a cost-
effective new pipeline and a link to fresh natural gas sources for Europe.  
Based on these results, it is anticipated  that “Nabucco” will not only remain the name 
of a famous opera, but will also become the term associated with one of the most 
successful energy projects in Europe. 
3.1. Introduction and Motivation 
The Russian monopolistic dominance of the European Union’s natural gas supplies 
has put the independence of the EU foreign policy at risk (Schaffer, 2008). Currently, 
roughly a third of natural gas used in the European Union comes through Kremlin-
controlled east-west pipelines (The Economist, 2009) and some sources even sur-
mise that half of all the gas the EU imports comes from Russia (Von Hirschhausen & 
Meinhart & Pavel, 2005; The Economist, 2007). Thus the EU may, in many respects, 
be seen as a captive market, largely dependent on pipeline supply from Russia 
(European Gas, 2007). In recent years, the Kremlin has abruptly cut off gas deliver-
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ies several times after disputes with transit countries such as Ukraine. This is quite 
alarming considering that eighty percent of natural gas travelling from Russia to the 
EU passes through Ukraine (Freifeld, 2009). The Nabucco project might potentially 
enhance the EU’s energy supply security, one of the top three priorities within the EU 
(Percebois, 2008), in future years. This paper gives an introduction to and evaluation 
of the Nabucco project. 
The growth in demand for natural gas in the European Union is expected to continue 
in the next 25 years (BCG, 2005). As can be seen in Figure 1 (left), European gas 
consumption will grow – largely due to increased gas-fired power generation (Bothe 
& Lochner, 2008; Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2007) – from approximately 500 bcm in 2005, 
valued at about USD 100 billion (Schaffer, 2008), to about 816 bcm in 2030 (OME, 
2006) representing an average growth rate of 2% per annum.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Left: Forecast of Gas Supply Europe (OME, 2006) 
 Right: Forecast of EU Gas Production Decline (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008) 
As the indigenous gas production of the European Union declines (BCG, 2005), a 
growing gap between gas production and gas demand – as illustrated by Figure 1 
(right) – can be expected in the coming years (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008). 
This stems from the fact that, at its present rate of consumption, the EU has only a 
ten-year supply of natural gas within its own borders, making imports of natural gas a 
necessity (Schaffer, 2008). Thus, increasing gas demands on the one hand paired 
with decreasing EU production on the other make a strong case for investing in new 
pipeline infrastructure (Lise & Hobbs & Oostvoorn, 2008; Finon & Locatelli, 2008; 
Mavrakis & Thomaidis & Ntroukas, 2006).  
                                                
2 Latest estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009) partly update 
these demand estimates due to the general economic downturn to a European Union gas demand of 
about 619 bcm in 2030. However, the general trend for strong growth in gas demand remains. 
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Therefore, new infrastructure sources have to be established for the EU gas markets 
to meet the expected future gas demand. At present, there are three main sources of 
gas for the European Union – the first is Russia, the second is Norway, and the third 
is Algeria (see Figure 2). According to forecasts for the future EU gas supply, it can 
be seen that Russia, Algeria and  Norway will not only keep their important supply 
roles but will even see their volumes nearly double by 2030 (BCG, 2005; Kjärstad & 
Johnsson, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Left: Three main sources of gas for Europe (BP Statistical Review, 2007)                                             
 Right: % of Russian Gas of European Union Gas Imports (Rough Own Calculation) 
The Nabucco project, which takes its name from the Giuseppe Verdi opera that the 
Consortium members attended after their first meeting, represents a new natural gas 
pipeline that will begin at the eastern border of Turkey and will connect the Caspian 
Region and the Middle East via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and 
further on with Central and Western Europe gas markets (Nabucco, 2009). The pipe-
line length will be approximately 3,300 km, stretching from the Georgian/Turkish 
and/or Iranian/Turkish border to Baumgarten in Austria. Additional feeder pipelines, 
as outlined in Figure 3 (left), are possible for Iraqi gas (RWE, 2009). Based on tech-
nical market studies, the pipeline has been designed to transport a maximum amount 
of 31 bcm per year (Nabucco, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Left: Map of Nabucco Pipeline Route (RWE, 2009) 
Right: Nabucco as the missing link to new gas (figures in bcm) (BP Statistical Review, 2006) 
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Nabucco Shareholders are RWE (Germany), OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), Trans-
gaz (Romania), Bulgarian Energy Holding (Bulgaria) and Botas (Turkey). Currently, 
each shareholder holds an equal share of 16.67 % (Nabucco, 2009). Estimated in-
vestment costs including financing costs for the complete new pipeline system 
amount to approximately EUR 7.9 billion (RWE, 2009). 
The project has the unique value proposition of encompassing several possibilities 
for new gas sources to be fed into the pipeline, such as gas from Azerbaijan, Ka-
zakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq. The good news for Europe is that, in contrast 
to oil, most experts predict that natural gas supplies will increase in future years as 
there are huge gas reserves available around Europe (European Gas, 2007; Bothe & 
Lochner, 2008; Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2007). However the challenge is how to trans-
port the gas to the consumers (Bothe & Lochner, 2008). As illustrated by Figure 3 
(right), the Nabucco project may be seen as the missing link between giant sources 
of gas and potential gas consuming markets (BP Statistical Review, 2006). The Cas-
pian Region, the Middle East and Egypt, which hold the largest gas reserves world-
wide, play a crucial role in terms of diversification of supply as well as security of 
supply for Europe (Mavrakis & Thomaidis & Ntroukas, 2006). The opening up of a 
fourth main supply corridor might be considered the only solution to meet future EU 
gas demands (BCG, 2005). As such, Nabucco provides a promising beginning for 
enhancing the EU’s energy supply security in future years (Schaffer, 2008). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of 
the hypotheses that are to be examined. Next, Section 3 describes the applied re-
search methodology. In Section 4 the Open Season Capacity Allocation Process of 
the Nabucco project is outlined. Section 5 presents and discusses results. Ultimately, 
a conclusion is provided in section 6.  
3.2. Hypotheses 
This paper seeks to investigate three key hypotheses related to the Nabucco pipeline 
project and its capacity allocation process. While hypothesis (1) focuses on the 
strength of demand for the Nabucco pipeline, hypotheses (2) and (3) examine fair 
usage rights and cost effectiveness of this project. 
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First, we wish to investigate whether the Nabucco gas pipeline can be envisioned to 
be in strong demand by potential gas shippers. Based on EU gas demand forecasts 
and expected developments of indigenous gas production (see Section 1), a strong 
case for demanding new pipeline infrastructure capacity can be expected. Strong 
demand by potential gas shippers would result in good pipeline capacity utilization on 
the one hand and, importantly for Europe, would prove that this pipeline is necessary. 
Analogous to the favourable outcomes of a good initial public offering (IPO) of a 
company on a stock market, capacity overbooking is expected to occur, pointing at 
strong demand by shippers. Hence, the first hypothesis claims this formally: 
Hypothesis 1:  The Nabucco gas pipeline capacity is in strong demand by 
gas shippers.  
Next, this paper analyses whether Nabucco provides a fair capacity allocation, not 
only to shareholder and associated company shippers, but also to external, third 
party gas shippers. The Inter-Governmental Agreement among the transit countries 
(IGA, 2009) requires that a minimum of fifty percent of the Nabucco gas-transporting 
capacities per year are reserved for third party access. Under such circumstances, 
increasing competition in the gas markets can be achieved (Cremer & Gasmi & Laf-
font, 2003). Based upon these expectations, the second hypothesis claims: 
Hypothesis 2: The Nabucco gas pipeline provides a fair capacity alloca-
tion for third party shippers that is also used by third party 
shippers. 
Finally, this paper engages in competitive benchmarking of the major pipeline pro-
jects under way: Nabucco, South Stream, and Nord Stream (I and II). A comparison 
of these gas pipeline projects based on publicly-available information on gas sup-
plies, gas markets, transportation capacities, pipeline length, and capital expendi-
tures will provide a like-for-like quantitative comparison. Clearly, a new competitive 
pipeline would be able to, apart from securing the gas for Europe, also provide com-
petitively-priced gas for European consumers. In anticipation that Nabucco could be 
a cost-competitive pipeline, Hypothesis 3 states: 
Hypothesis 3: The Nabucco gas pipeline is a cost-effective way to bring 
new natural gas to Europe. 
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3.3. Method 
The research methods applied in this paper are manifold. In fact, a combination of 
natural experiment setting, public data analysis, competitive benchmarking and em-
pirical market survey are applied.  
First, the Nabucco project itself serves as an excellent natural experiment (Meyer, 
1995) that allows us to analyse the three key hypotheses outlined in the previous 
section. As has become popular in energy research (Pickl & Wagner & Wirl, 2009; 
Wu & Lampietti & Meyer, 2004; Asche & Osmundsen & Sandsmark, 2006; Douglas, 
2006; Florio, 2007; Bellas & Lange, 2008), an event study is carried out.  
Furthermore, publicly available data from different companies’ web sites and other 
public sources are collected. These data are then analysed using competitive 
benchmarking (e.g. between the different pipeline projects that are currently in the 
planning stage). 
Finally, an empirical market survey is conducted with 54 potential gas shippers. By 
inquiring about their potential gas supply and demand in future years, inferences re-
garding the expected Nabucco pipeline capacity utilization – and hence overall ne-
cessity for the Nabucco pipeline for Europe – can be drawn. More specifically, the 54 
most likely Nabucco gas shippers (focusing on company size and regional market 
focus) were selected from a customer-relationship-management (CRM) software. 
These include the six Nabucco shareholder shippers (see Section 1) and the biggest 
gas companies within the specific Nabucco regional market focus. Subsequently, the 
market survey participants were contacted in the period 2008 to 2009 per postal let-
ter including a project introduction and a written questionnaire. Out of these 54 poten-
tial Nabucco gas shippers, 21 provided a response whereof 16 furnished sufficiently 
concrete answers to be included in the evaluation of the market survey. The obtained 
results were then descriptively analysed using Microsoft Excel. This empirical market 
survey serves as an important input factor for the upcoming Nabucco open season 
capacity allocation process. 
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3.4. The Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allocation Process 
Rather then buying and selling gas itself, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International 
company is set up to develop, establish and construct the pipeline, and then to rent 
pipeline transportation capacities on long- and short-term bases to interested ship-
pers (Nabucco, 2009). Hence the gas will be bought, delivered and sold by shippers, 
who will be purchasing transport capacities to ship the gas to Europe. 
In order to allocate gas transportation capacities, a non-discriminatory and transpar-
ent open season capacity allocation process – a special form of auction (Haase & 
Bressers, 2008) – will be carried out in 2010 to allow potential shippers to express 
their interest in project participation and to make firm bookings (RWE, 2009). Thus, 
open season is in fact the name of a tender process for pipeline transportation ca-
pacity. 
The introduction of open season access to pipeline transportation capacity has 
unlocked two distinctive industries: the natural-gas market, where agents trade natu-
ral gas as a commodity, and the market for pipeline transportation services, where 
agents trade services to ship natural gas through the pipeline networks (Raineri & 
Kuflik, 2003). This is an important concept that will contribute to a competitive Euro-
pean gas infrastructure market since former contracts were often negotiated bilater-
ally in non-transparent and less competitive manners (De Joode &  Van Oostvoorn, 
2007). Following Smith, De Vany and Michaels (1990), the use of “Exchangable 
Transport Entitlements” – which gives the right to utilize, to lease, or to sell the pipe-
line capacity in a specific segment for a specific period – makes sure that the 
(scarce) capacity can be used by those who value it most, with the possibility of be-
ing resold in a secondary market (Raineri & Kuflik, 2003). Consequently, gas pipeline 
transportation becomes a property right, the gas pipeline becomes a transportation 
right supplier, and the owners of these rights offer transportation capacity (Walls, 
1995). 
The specific Nabucco open season capacity allocation auction will contain two 
phases (see Figure 4): In the first phase, the offer is addressed to the shareholders 
and associated companies for an amount up to 15.5 bcm - fifty percent of Nabucco's 
maximum transport capacity (Nabucco, 2009). If capacity commitments of sharehold-
ers and associated companies are exceeding the reserved capacity of fifty percent, 
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these commitments will be reduced and allocated pro rata. In the case that share-
holders will commit for less than the reserved fifty percent of transportation capacity 
in the first open season round, the remaining capacity will be offered in the second 
open season round. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Phases of the Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allocation Process 
In a second phase, Nabucco will offer, as a minimum, the remaining fifty percent – in 
fact a volume of 15.5 bcm of gas transporting capacity per year is pre-determined for 
third party access (IGA, 2009) – to external, third party companies in conjunction with 
shareholders and associated companies, offering them the same conditions and 
transparency as in the first phase. In this procedure all market participants will have 
the possibility of securing long-term contracts.  
In general, it is foreseen that ninety percent of the overall capacity is reserved for 
long term transportation contracts (more than 1 year, but typically 25 years). How-
ever, ten percent of the maximum transportation capacity shall be reserved for short 
term contract (ranging from single days up to the maximum of one year) and will be 
available in the second phase of the open season process (Nabucco, 2009). The en-
tire Nabucco open season capacity allocation process will start in the third quarter of 
2010 and last for approximately six months (Nabucco, 2009). 
3.5. Results 
In order to obtain the results with reference to the first hypothesis – i.e. the Nabucco 
gas pipeline capacity is strongly demanded by shippers – an empirical market survey 
was conducted with 54 potential gas shippers. By inquiring about their potential gas 
supply and demand in future years, statements regarding the expected Nabucco 
pipeline capacity / volume utilization – and hence overall necessity for the Nabucco 
pipeline for Europe – can be made. Twenty-one shippers (including the six Nabucco 
shareholding shippers and 15 third party shippers) showed interest, out of which six-
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teen (including the six Nabucco shareholding shippers and 10 third party shippers) 
gave a sufficiently concrete answer to be included in the evaluation of the market 
survey on a non-binding basis about their interest in Nabucco pipeline capacities. 
Figure 5 below illustrates the results of this survey and points out that in every year 
demand for Nabucco pipeline capacities / volumes is far higher than the actual pipe-
line capacities / volumes. Depending on whether we look at volumes (in bcm per 
year) or capacities (i.e. flow rate x distance), between 140% and 460% or between 
115% and 375% of the Nabucco gas pipeline is demanded by shippers. Thus, we 
can conclude that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed and the Nabucco gas pipeline is indeed 
in strong demand by shippers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Demand for the Nabucco Pipeline as Percentage of Volumes and Capacities 
The evaluation of the outcomes regarding the second hypothesis – dealing with the 
question of whether the Nabucco gas pipeline provides a fair capacity allocation to 
third party shippers – was supported by the aforementioned empirical market survey 
with potential gas shippers as well. Figure 6 shows the capacity volume responses of 
the 16 gas shippers (i.e. six Nabucco shareholding shippers and ten third party ship-
pers) that were included in the evaluation of the market survey. It shows that indeed 
a fair, roughly fifty-to-fifty percentage split of pipeline transportation capacities be-
tween shareholding shippers and external, third party shippers can be expected in 
each year of pipeline operation. Therefore, rather than the pipeline being entirely re-
served for gas owned by the pipeline builders, by a non-discriminatory open season 
approach, the Nabucco project is able to increase competition in the European gas 
market (RWE, 2009). Hence Hypothesis 2 can be confirmed: the Nabucco gas pipe-
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line provides a fair capacity allocation to third party shippers that is also utilized by 
third party shippers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Fair Capacity Allocation for Third Party Shippers 
Finally, we turn to the evaluation of Hypothesis 3 and its assertion that the Nabucco 
gas pipeline is a cost-effective way to bring new gas to Europe. Here the results of 
the competitive benchmarking of the major gas pipeline projects’ under planning – 
namely Nabucco, South Stream and Nord Stream (I and II) – are provided.  
The input source for this competitive benchmarking is publicly available information 
on transportation capacities, pipeline length, and capital expenditures of these pipe-
lines. Figure 7 below summarises these projections:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Major Gas Pipeline Projects: Capacities, Length, and Capital Expenditures (RWE, 2009; IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2009; Reuters, 2007) 
To create like-for-like comparisons, a common gas supply start time (i.e. beginning of 
2015), a common utilization rate (i.e. 90%), equal relative operational expenditures 
(i.e. 1.5% of capital expenditures), the same evaluation period of 25 years, and iden-
tical financial assumptions (i.e. 100% equity financing, internal rate of return require-
ments of 11.5%) were chosen (own industry assumptions). For Nabucco and South 
Stream a common gas source (i.e. Azerbaijan off-shore Caspian Sea gas) is as-
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sumed. For Nord Stream (I and II) this is not the case, its inclusion is for transport 
cost benchmarking purposes only. 
Next, to evaluate tariffs and provide for a competitive benchmarking, the following 
tariff cost functions are applied: 
  
 
 
with Cn … Cash flows per period  so that 
 
 
 
  
with 
Tariff2 … Total Tariff for the full pipeline distance per 1.000 m3 per year; 
PipelineCapacity … Pipeline specific as per Figure 7 above; 
CAPEX … Pipeline specific capital expenditures as per Figure 7 above; 
OPEX … Operational expenditures at 1.5% of Capital Expenditures; 
UtilizationRate … 90%; 
r … 11.5%. 
and 
 
 
 
with  
Tariff1 … Distance-related Tariff; 
PipelineLength … Pipeline specific pipeline length as per Figure 7 above. 
Figure 8 shows the results of this competitive benchmarking and indicates that 
Nabucco is more cost-effective than South Stream, its direct Southern corridor pipe-
line competitor, for both a distance-related tariff comparison and total tariff compari-
son. In fact, based on the assumptions taken, Nabucco can be expected to offer a 
22% (i.e. distance-related tariff: EUR 2,38 vs. EUR 3,05) to 19% (i.e. total tariff: EUR 
78,70 vs. EUR 97,59) lower gas transportation tariff to potential shippers than South 
Stream. With costs of EUR 25 billion (American Chronicle, 2009; RWE, 2009) Rus-
sia’s alternative pipeline across the Black Sea, the South Stream project through 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary to Austria, or alternatively through Slovenia to Italy 
(MacDonald, 2008), will not be competitive, as according to analyst views it is too 
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expensive (The Economist, 2009b). Moreover, it would not diversify Europe’s energy 
supplies away from Russia. Compared to Nord Stream (I and II), Nabucco is more 
cost-effective on a distance-related tariff basis (34%, i.e. EUR 2,38 vs. EUR 3,62) 
and on almost equal conditions in terms of total tariff (i.e. EUR 78,70 vs. EUR 76,01). 
The minor total tariff surplus comes from the fact that Nord Stream is considerably 
shorter in terms of pipeline length (2.100 km vs. 3.300 km) than Nabucco. Further 
separate tariff evaluations of Nord Stream I and II – this pipeline is built in two parallel 
legs – are provided below. In an overall view, it can be stated that Nabucco provides 
a 3% lower total tariff (EUR 78,70 vs. average EUR 81,41) and a 55% lower dis-
tance-related tariff (EUR 2,38 vs. average EUR 5,3§) when comparing it to the aver-
age of South Stream, Nord Stream (I and II), Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II. In 
any event, neither South Stream nor Nord Stream would diversify the EU’s energy 
supplies away from Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Major Gas Pipeline Projects: Tariff Comparison 
The only alternative to new pipelines – increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports 
– seems unpromising. LNG alone, with 55.3 billion cubic meters of imports into 
Europe in 2008 (E.ON Ruhrgas, 2009) providing just about 10% of overall supplies 
will not be able to shoulder the increasing gas supply requirements of Europe. In any 
event, even though substantial decreases are happening, LNG is still more costly 
than piped gas at distances up to 3.000 to 4.000 kilometres (Kjärstad & Johnsson, 
2007). 
Hence, the third hypothesis can be confirmed: the Nabucco gas pipeline is a cost-
effective way to bring new gas to Europe. In this way, a more competitive European 
gas market with accompanying lower costs can be expected. This can only benefit 
European consumers. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
This paper evaluated the Nabucco Project as a major means to enhance the EU’s 
energy supply security in future years by counteracting the increasing Russian mo-
nopolistic dominance of European gas supplies.  
Three main research questions were posed, centering on the strength of demand for 
the Nabucco pipeline (H1), fair access rights (H2), and overall cost effectiveness 
(H3). All three hypotheses encouragingly point into the envisioned direction: Increas-
ing gas demand and decreasing indigenous production make a new gas pipeline 
necessary for Europe. The empirical survey demonstrated that the Nabucco gas 
pipeline is strongly demanded by gas shippers (H1). Furthermore, through its open 
season capacity allocation process, the empirical survey revealed that Nabucco pro-
vides a fair capacity allocation of fifty percent to third party shippers (H2), and that 
this allocation will be fully utilized, thus enhancing competition. Finally, competitive 
benchmarking showed that Nabucco is in fact a cost-effective pipeline (H3).  Indeed, 
it is the currently missing link that will provide an economical connection to new natu-
ral gas supplies for Europe (BP Statistical Review, 2006; RWE, 2009). 
Based on these results, it is anticipated  that “Nabucco” will not only remain the name 
of a famous opera, but will also become the term associated with one of the most 
successful energy projects in Europe. Previous research has already shown that the 
“great natural gas pipeline game” can be won (Schaffer, 2008), but only by acting 
with rapid commitment. Hopefully commerce is not taking back seat to politics 
(Freifeld, 2009). However, this possible success will still require a lot of work and 
commitment from the actual participants and Europe itself with strong multilateral di-
rection (Weisser, 2007). Political support already in place in the form of the Inter 
State Agreement, signed in Ankara on July 13th 2009 between the states of the 
Nabucco transit countries (IGA, 2009), is a good step in the right direction to harmo-
nizing the legal framework by granting stable and equal transport conditions for all 
partners and customers. Nabucco is the only pipeline project currently under consid-
eration with such an agreement in place. Now that this agreement is in place, “this 
pipeline is inevitable rather than just probable”, as European Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso put it in July of last year (Freifeld, 2009). 
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The undertaken empirical market survey serves as an important input factor for the 
actual Nabucco open season capacity allocation process to be carried out in the third 
and fourth quarter of 2010. In further research, the results of this open season capac-
ity allocation process will be analysed in detail. 
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4. Paper 3 – Auction Design for Gas Pipeline Trans-
portation Capacity – The Case of Nabucco 
This Paper is at the time of submission of this dissertation under second stage review 
by an International Journal and was presented at the 11th IAEE European Energy 
Conference (International Association of Energy Economics, Energy Economy, Poli-
cies and Supply Security: Surviving the Global Economic Crisis) in Vilnius / Lithuania 
in August 2010. 
Abstract 
As a response to the Russian dominance of the European Union’s (EU’s) natural gas 
supplies and the combination of the EU’s increasing gas demands and decreasing 
indigenous gas production, major gas pipeline projects are currently under way in 
order to enhance the security of the EU’s energy supply. Oftentimes to raise financ-
ing and to allocate gas transportation capacities special forms of auctions are carried 
out to allow gas shippers to make firm bookings.  
In recent years, auctions have emerged as one of the most successful allocation 
mechanisms in microeconomic theory. However, different auction design allocation 
mechanisms can lead to different outcomes making the choice of auction design a 
decisive one, especially for divisible-good auctions. This paper seeks to give a formu-
lation of an optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. Specifi-
cally three different allocation mechanism designs are tested: (i) Biggest Net Present 
Value Contract Allocation; (ii) Pro Rata Allocation; and (iii) Allocation per Optimiza-
tion. In addition, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project is taken as a case study to ex-
perimentally and empirically show the results of such auction designs. 
Results show that a trade-off between revenue optimization and fair and transparent 
allocation can be observed: Allocation per Optimization is the favourable auction de-
sign when revenue maximization is more important than fair and transparent alloca-
tion. On the other hand, Pro Rata Allocation is the auction design to be chosen when 
fairness and transparency of allocation are considered most central. 
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4.1. Introduction and Motivation 
As a response to the Russian monopolistic dominance of the European Union’s natu-
ral gas supplies (Schaffer, 2008) and the combination of the European Union’s in-
creasing gas demands and decreasing indigenous gas production (IEA World Energy 
Outlook, 2008 & 2009), major gas transportation pipeline projects are currently under 
way in order to enhance the EU’s energy supply security, one of the top three priori-
ties within the EU (Percebois, 2008), in future years. Rather then buying and selling 
gas itself, many gas pipeline companies are set up to develop and construct pipe-
lines, and to rent its transportation capacities on long- and short-term basis to inter-
ested shippers. The financing by banks of any pipeline requires the contractual 
commitment from shippers to pay for gas shipments over an extended period of time 
(Marks, 2009; Tye & Garcia, 2007). In order to obtain these commitments and allo-
cate these gas transportation capacities, special forms of auctions (Haase & Bress-
ers, 2008) are carried out to allow potential shippers to express their interest in pro-
ject participation and to make firm bookings. Auction theory has attracted enormous 
attention in the last few years (see Klemperer, 1999, 2000, and 2002 for a review of 
auction theory). Its emergence as one of the most successful development in micro-
economic and game theory in the last decades has led to the award of the Nobel 
Price in Economics to Vernon Smith in 2002 for his tests of different auction forms 
(Stockholm Nobel Price Announcement, 2002; Smith, 1965; Smith 1976a; Smith 
1976b; Copping, Smith & Titus, 1980). Theoretical and empirical research shows that 
from an economic perspective, auctions are an appropriate mechanism for allocation 
as they tend to be beneficial with regards to price determination, distributional and 
efficiency goals, and revenue maximization (Klemperer, 2004; Milgrom, 2004). How-
ever, different auction designs and allocation mechanisms can lead to different out-
comes. Therefore the choice of auction rules is a decisive challenge (Ockenfels, 
2009) and determining success factor for each particular auction. This especially 
holds true for auctions for divisible goods that are at risk of yielding significantly lower 
overall revenues than ordinary one-item auctions (Wilson, 1979). 
Therefore, this paper sets out to provide a mathematical formulation of alternative 
auction designs for gas pipeline transportation capacity. Furthermore, the Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline Project – by some named the most economic link to new gas (Pickl & 
Wirl, 2010; RWE, 2009) and certainly one of the most prominent energy projects ever 
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– is taken as a case study to experimentally and empirically show the results of such 
alternative auction designs. These results lead to a conclusion of a potentially optimal 
auction design considering particular defined auction goals. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a back-
ground on general auction theory and its application to energy markets. Section 3 
gives an overview of the applied research methods in this paper. Next, Section 4 out-
lines the Nabucco auction design: the strategic auction goals are introduced, the auc-
tion process is described, the empirical market-survey received bids are presented 
and alternative capacity allocation designs are devised. Section 5 presents and dis-
cusses results of the alternative auction allocation designs. Ultimately, a conclusion 
is provided in section 6. 
4.2. Background 
According to general auction theory, auctions are traditionally classified into four 
types (Stockholm Nobel Price Announcement, 2002). In an English auction, bidders 
announce their bids sequentially and in an increasing manner until no higher bid is 
received by the auctioneer. This is also called an open ascending price auction. In a 
Dutch or descending auction, a high first bid is announced by the auctioneer and is 
gradually lowered until some bidder chooses to bid. In the other two classical auction 
forms, all bidders simultaneously submit their bids in sealed form and the unit for sale 
is allocated to the highest bidder (Stockholm Nobel Price Announcement, 2002). In 
the first-price sealed bid auction, this bidder pays his or her bid to the seller; while in 
the second-price sealed bid auction – also known as Vickrey auction (Blume et al., 
2009; Chen, 2007; Milgrom, 1989; Vickrey, 1961) – the winning bidder pays only the 
second highest bid. Under the Vickrey auction, bidders have a dominant strategy to 
truthfully report their values to the auctioneer (Kwasnica et al., 2005). An additional 
type of auction is the Walrasian auction in which the auctioneer takes bids from both 
buyers and sellers and then progressively either raises or drops prices depending on 
the received bids (Sun & Yang, 2009; Shneyerov, 2002; Ermoliev & Michalevich & 
Nentjes, 2000; Smith, 1965). The Walrasian auction concludes when supply and de-
mand balance (Jaffe & Walker, 1983).  
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In liberalized energy markets, the use of auctions represents an important develop-
ment in the regulation of the formerly publicly owned energy utilities (Porter, 1995; 
Cameron & Cramton & Wilson, 1997). They offers the prospects of achieving optimal, 
or near-optimal, allocation of existing capacities and a price mechanism for establish-
ing whether new investment is needed (Porter, 1995). In addition, these auctions are 
also Pareto-optimal thus directly improving welfare in the sense that the (scarce) unit 
for sale is expected to be allocated to users, whose bids reveal that they place the 
greatest value on it (Hawdon & Stevens, 2001) with the possibility of being resold in a 
secondary market (Raineri & Kuflik, 2003).  
Yet, for all their positive promises in practice many auctions have disappointed, es-
pecially as complex problems bedevil auctions of dearer goods (The Economist, 
2002) and fungible commodities (Vickrey, 1961) like also gas pipeline transportation 
capacities. 
Auctions for gas pipeline transportation capacities, often termed open seasons, are in 
fact a special form of an auction (Haase & Bressers, 2008). The here presented 
Nabucco auction mechanism may come closest to an English auction – where, under 
some of the proposed allocation mechanism designs (see Section 4.5), the highest 
present contract value bidders get selected - and a Walrasian Auction (for tariff adap-
tion when supply and demand balance). Even sealed first price bid auctions could be 
thought of to have common features in the sense that only one bid is submitted per 
shipper and competitors cannot directly see them. More specifically, the Nabucco 
auction design, in its full complexity, is a sequential (non-binding, binding, share-
holder/non-shareholder), three dimensional (distance, flow rate, years, note: tariff is 
fixed), multi-attribute (reverse flow, exit/entry points phases), first price (i.e. first reve-
nue) auction with multiple winners. The tariff charged is the one that is concluded 
when a balance between supply and demand is achieved. 
Further special features include a non-binding auction phase for informational pur-
poses. An important aspect of any market is the information available to participants. 
Especially in auctions information can play a crucial role (Porter, 1995). If revenue 
raising is an objective, all information possessed by the seller should be published 
(Hawdon & Stevens, 2001). The social and private costs of information imperfection 
are compounded in strategic settings, where participants may exploit informational 
asymmetries. If one buyer has access to information superior to that of rivals informa-
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tional rents may be obtained and as the results are not zero-sum, inefficiencies may 
result (Porter, 1995). Therefore, Nabucco’s non-binding auction phase serves an im-
portant informational purpose. It shall be noted that – while some researchers argue 
in favor of the provision of asymmetric information to bidders (Hagedorn, 2009; Ber-
gemann & Pesendorfer, 2007) – for the Nabucco auction design the same symmetric 
information level has to be made available to all bidders for non-discriminatory rea-
sons. 
An additional specific feature of the Nabucco auction design is that not the highest 
bidder in terms of transportation price is selected, but – as in fact the distance related 
tariffs are predetermined and equal for all bidders (see Pickl & Wirl, 2010) – alloca-
tion to a set of bidders (i.e. the winners’ set) takes place according to one of the allo-
cation mechanism designs proposed in Section 4.5. As such an often documented 
problem in auctions – the winners curse, in which large numbers of bidders generate 
more aggressive biddings and result in bankruptcies and negative profits of the (sin-
gle) auction winner (Holt & Sherman, 1994; Kagel & Levin, 1986; Milgrom, 1982; Ca-
pen & Clapp & Cambell, 1971) – are not valid for this auction design as in fact there 
is a set of auction winners (i.e. the allocation outcome winners) comparable to Wil-
son’s eminent paper on auctions of shares (1979). 
4.3. Method 
The research methods applied in this paper are manifold. In fact, a combination of 
empirical market survey of auction volumes and bid patterns, mathematical formula-
tion of allocation mechanism design and experimental testing of auction allocation is 
carried out. 
First, the potentially optimal auction design is mathematically formulated to achieve 
its strategic goals. In this way this paper follows eminent auction theory papers such 
as Vickrey (1961), Wilson (1979), Chao and Wilson (2002), Ledyard et al. (2002), 
Rajnish & Shmuel (2002), Sunnevag (2003), Kwasnica et al. (2005), Parkes and 
Kalagnanam (2005), and Hagedorn (2009). In the course of doing so different alloca-
tion mechanism designs are proposed. 
Next, an empirical market survey is conducted with 54 potential gas shippers to in-
vestigate the expected auction volumes and bid volume patterns. More specifically, 
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the 54 most likely Nabucco gas shippers (chosen based on company size and re-
gional market focus) were selected from a customer-relationship-management (CRM) 
software. These include the six Nabucco shareholder shippers and the biggest gas 
companies within the specific Nabucco regional market focus. Subsequently, the 
market survey addressees were contacted in the period 2008 to 2009 per postal let-
ter including a project introduction and a written questionnaire. Out of these 54 poten-
tial Nabucco gas shippers, 21 provided a response whereof 17 furnished sufficiently 
concrete answers to be included in the evaluation of the auction volumes and bid pat-
terns.  
Finally, the different proposed allocation designs are experimentally tested using the 
auction volumes and bid patterns from the empirical market survey. That is we use 
the test bed approach of experimental economics (Kwasnica et al., 2005). The use of 
laboratories as test beds for complex auctions in complex environments began with 
Ferejohn et al. (1979), Smith (1979), Grether et al. (1981), and Rassenti et al. (1982). 
This methodology has proven to be successful in providing guidance for the design of 
a variety of implemented auctions (Plott, 1997; Ishikida et al., 2001; Ledyard et al., 
1997). The outcomes are evaluated on three grounds: revenue raising potential / effi-
ciency, fairness and transparency. This experimental testing serves as an important 
input factor for the upcoming Nabucco Capacity Auction and resembles a real life 
auction application as in Porter (1995) and Loxley & Salant (2004). As has become 
popular in energy research (Pickl & Wagner & Wirl, 2009; Wu & Lampietti & Meyer, 
2004; Asche & Osmundsen & Sandsmark, 2006; Douglas, 2006; Florio, 2007; Bellas 
& Lange, 2008), an event study is presented. 
4.4. Designing the Nabucco Auction 
4.4.1. Strategic Objectives and Performance Measures 
When developing and choosing an auction design, a range of evaluation criteria may 
be used and, in general, trade-offs between these measures can be expected 
(Kwasnica et al., 2005; Pekec & Rothkopf, 2003). Following the strategic objectives 
of the Nabucco project (Nabucco, 2009), the different experimental designs (see sec-
tion 4.5) shall be evaluated on three grounds: revenue raising potential/efficiency, 
fairness and transparency. 
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Revenue raising maximization is an obvious choice where the auction designer hap-
pens to be the seller of the item to be auctioned (Kwasnica et al., 2005). Revenue 
raising potential/efficiency in this paper is measured by three criteria: 
The first is maximum annual revenue efficiency calculated as per the following for-
mula: 
 
 
with 
AllocatedCapacityt … the allocated capacity in year t; 
TotalPipelineCapacityt … the total Nabucco pipeline capacity of 31 bcm per year t; 
Note: 25 years is taken as the evaluation period of the pipeline; 
Note: As the transport tariff is constant it is not included in this formula. 
The second is average annual revenue efficiency computed by: 
 
 
with 
AllocatedCapacityi … the allocated capacity in year i; 
TotalPipelineCapacityi … the total Nabucco pipeline capacity of 31 bcm per year I; 
Note: 25 years is taken as the evaluation period of the pipeline; 
Note: As the transport tariff is constant it is not included in this formula. 
The third is total foregone revenue captured by: 
 
 
with 
AllocatedCapacityi … the allocated capacity in year i; 
TotalPipelineCapacityi … the total Nabucco pipeline capacity of 31 bcm per year i. 
Tariff … the transport tariff for the full pipeline distance per 1.000 m3 per year. 
Note: 25 years is taken as the evaluation period of the pipeline. 
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In general, here it is not the absolute value we place the emphasis on, but the rela-
tive performance measure across the different proposed auction designs. 
Next, the fairness and transparency evaluation criteria stem from the European Un-
ion energy policy aim to reach non-discriminatory access to pipeline infrastructure for 
third party shippers (EU Gas Directive, 2003; EU Gas Regulation, 2005; Cremer & 
Gasmi & Laffont, 2003). Fairness and appearance of fairness are important in auc-
tions to ensure that all potential bidders have an equal chance (Rothkopf & Park, 
2001). Fairness and transparency of non-discriminatory access to the Nabucco pipe-
line infrastructure by the allocation mechanism experimental designs in this paper are 
measured by three indicators: 
The first is the total portfolio size of awarded bidders. The closer this number is to the 
number of participating bidders (see Section 4.4) the fairer is the allocation mecha-
nism’s experimental design. 
 
 
 
with 
Qi … Decision 0 or 1 of whether to allocate the respective bidder bi or not. 
The second is portfolio efficiency measured by the total portfolio size of awarded bid-
ders as a fraction of participating bidders as outlined by the following formula: 
 
The closer this second fairness evaluation criterion number is to 1 the better is the 
allocation mechanism experimental designs. 
The third fairness and transparency evaluation criterion is a qualitative performance 
measure and is evaluating whether the respective allocation mechanism experimen-
tal design is discriminating any particular bidder group with regards to any specific 
bidder group characteristic and whether it provides for a transparent way of allocation 
that can easily be understood and strategically assessed by bidders. 
The remaining strategic auctions goals such as arriving at a competitive tariff (i.e. the 
transportation tariff is pre-determined at the beginning of the auction and then 
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adapted to bid volume depending on capacity utilization), seller return on equity, 
short term capacity reservations, and creditworthiness of the bidders (which is impor-
tant for any successful auction, since if a winning bid were to prove unsupportable by 
the bidder, the auction would have to be held again (Hawdon & Stevens, 2001)) shall 
be mentioned here, yet are not evaluated separately for the purposes of this paper. 
4.4.2. A Process Description of the Nabucco Auction 
Rather than buying and selling gas itself, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International 
company is set up to develop, establish and construct the pipeline, and to rent pipe-
line transportation capacities on long- and short-term basis to interested shippers 
(Nabucco, 2009). Hence the gas will be bought, delivered and sold by shippers, 
which will be purchasing transport capacities to ship the gas to Europe. 
In order to allocate gas transportation capacities a non-discriminatory and transpar-
ent open season capacity allocation process – a special form of auction (Haase & 
Bressers, 2008) – will be carried out in 2010/2011 to allow potential shippers to ex-
press their interest in project participation and to make firm bookings (RWE, 2009). 
Thus open season in fact is the name of a tender process for pipeline transportation 
capacity. 
The introduction of open season access to pipeline transportation capacity has 
unlocked two distinctive industries: the natural-gas market, where agents trade natu-
ral gas as a commodity, and the market for pipeline transportation services, where 
agents trade services to ship natural gas through the pipeline networks (Raineri & 
Kuflik, 2003). This is an important concept that will contribute to a competitive Euro-
pean gas infrastructure market since former contracts were often negotiated bilater-
ally in non-transparent and less competitive manners (De Joode &  Van Oostvoorn, 
2007). Following Smith, De Vany and Michaels (1990) the use of “Exchangable 
Transport Entitlements” – which give the right to utilize, to lease, or to sell the pipe-
line capacity in a specific segment for a specific period – makes sure that the 
(scarce) capacity can be used by those who value it most, with the possibility of be-
ing resold in a secondary market (Raineri & Kuflik, 2003). Consequently, gas pipeline 
transportation becomes a property right, the gas pipeline becomes a transportation 
right supplier, and the owners of these rights offer transportation capacity (Walls, 
1995). 
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The specific Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allocation Process will contain two dis-
tinct phases – open season for shareholders and open season for third parties – 
each with two sub phases – a non-binding phase (to minimize risks and to get a bet-
ter feeling for the market and maximize the provision of information (Porter, 1995) 
and a binding phase (see Figure 1)):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Phases of the Nabucco Open Season Capacity Allocation Process (see Pickl & Wirl, 2010). 
In the first phase, the offer is addressed to the shareholders and associated compa-
nies for an amount up to 15.5 bcm per year - fifty percent of Nabucco's maximum 
transport capacity. This first phase starts with a non-binding phase that, apart from a 
participation fee, does not carry any firm commitment to enter into a gas transporta-
tion contract. However, shippers have to take part in the non-binding open season in 
order to be allowed to take part in the binding open season round. The idea of the 
methodology is that shippers can not apply separately for the binding round in order 
to treat all shippers equally. Given bids by shippers during the non-binding round can 
not be reduced for the binding round in terms of capacity. Otherwise the shippers will 
lose their participation fee. Shippers, nonetheless, are allowed to confirm or even to 
increase their bid in the binding round. Shippers will get their participation fee re-
funded in case they are selected for the binding open season phase and they con-
firm/increase their non binding bid or if they are not selected to participate in the bind-
ing open season round. 
The non-binding phase is followed by a commitment phase, an assessment and ca-
pacity allocation procedure as well as the conclusion of the respective Long Term 
Transportation Agreements. 
If capacity commitments of shareholders and associated companies are exceeding 
the reserved capacity of fifty percent, these commitments will be reduced and allo-
cated as per a pre-defined allocation mechanism. In case shareholders will commit 
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for less than the reserved fifty percent of transportation capacity in the first open sea-
son round, the remaining capacity will be offered in the second open season round. 
In a second phase, Nabucco will offer, as a minimum, the remaining fifty percent – in 
fact a volume of 15.5 bcm of gas transporting capacity per year is pre-determined for 
third party access by the Inter State Agreement between the Nabucco transit coun-
tries – to external, third party companies, also including Nabucco shareholders, offer-
ing them the same conditions and transparency as in the first phase. In this proce-
dure all market participants will have the possibility of securing long-term contracts. 
Similar to the first phase, also this second phase includes a non-binding phase. 
In general, it is foreseen that ninety percent of the overall capacity is reserved for 
long term transportation contracts (more than 1 year, but typically 25 years). How-
ever, ten percent of the maximum transportation capacity shall be reserved for short 
term contracts (ranging from single days up to the maximum of one year) and will be 
available in the second phase of the open season process.  
The entire Nabucco open season capacity allocation process will start in late 2010 / 
early 2011 and will last for around six months. The specific tariff range mechanism – 
Nabucco will publish the tariff in a 3-tier approach – is presented in Figure 2. The fi-
nal tariff is concluded in a Walrasian auction mechanism when final demand is known 
and balances with supply (Jaffe & Walker, 1983; Sun & Yang, 2009; Shneyerov, 
2002; Ermoliev & Michalevich & Nentjes, 2000; Smith, 1965).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Tariff Range Mechanism. 
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4.4.3. Mathematical Formulation of Bidders Optimal Bidding Strat-
egy 
Rather than providing a fully general framework, in this paper we will focus on the 
most prominent factors of the particular designs we evaluate. Before mathematically 
formulating the auctioneer’s optimal capacity allocation rule, the bidders’ optimal bid-
ding strategy shall be outlined. Due to the inherent design complexity – and therefore 
partial impossibility to show the true optimal bidding strategies that lead to an equilib-
rium – this is done in a simplified manner. 
First a bidder would maximize his/her expected profits (E) that are constructed by 
subtracting the transport tariff (t) that he/she has to pay from the price differential of 
his/her gas purchasing price – the upstream price for gas (up) – and his/her gas sell-
ing price – the downstream price of gas (dp) – and multiplying it by his/her gas vol-
ume (F, i.e. total flow of the pipeline). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, the individual bidder’s volume transported (vi) becomes subject to the alloca-
tion mechanism process of the auctioneer and the maximum available capacity of 31 
bcm per year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the bidder would convert the bid to his/her risk appetite of being allocated by 
introducing a particular utility function.  
Theoretically to reach an equilibrium and to maximize overall pipeline revenues, 
truthful revelation should be a dominant strategy for every bidder/player (Hobbs et 
al., 2000). On the other hand, it shall be noted that strategic bidding behaviour might 
even have the potential to hurt the revenue outcome of the overall pipeline. It can 
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even lead to collusion, for example by smaller bidders. Therefore, it might be better 
not to encourage such strategic bidding behaviour altogether. 
4.4.4. Empirical Market Survey – Received Bids 
In order to obtain the expected auction volumes and bid volume patterns, an empiri-
cal market survey was conducted with 54 potential gas shippers. Out of these 54 po-
tential Nabucco gas shippers, twenty-one shippers (including the six Nabucco share-
holding shippers and fifteen third party shippers) showed interest whereof seventeen 
furnished sufficiently concrete answers to be included in the evaluation of the auction 
volumes and bid patterns. Figures 3 and Table 1 illustrate the results of the received 
bids (in Figure 4 actual company names are disguised for confidentiality purposes). 
Figure 3 points out that in every year demand for Nabucco pipeline capacities is 
higher than the actual pipeline capacities (i.e. depending on whether we look at vol-
umes (in bcm per year) or capacities (i.e. flow rate x distance), between 140% and 
460% or between 115% and 375% of the Nabucco gas pipeline is demanded by 
shippers). This expected overbooking makes a capacity allocation to selected bid-
ders necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Empirical Market Survey – Demand/Received Bids for the Nabucco Pipeline as Percentage 
of Volumes and Capacities (see Pickl & Wirl, 2010). 
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Table 1: Empirical Market Survey – Demand/Received Bids for the Nabucco Pipeline. 
4.4.5. Capacity Allocation – Experimental Design Overview 
Next, the experimental designs for capacity allocation shall be introduced. Different 
allocation mechanism designs are proposed and tested by the test bed approach of 
experimental economics (Kwasnica et al., 2005). Specifically, three different alloca-
tion mechanism designs are tested: i) Biggest net present value contract allocation; 
ii) Pro rata allocation; and iii) Allocation per optimization. The outcomes of these 
three different allocation mechanism designs are then evaluated on three grounds – 
revenue raising potential/efficiency, fairness and transparency – with the general goal 
to award the auction item (i.e. pipeline transportation capacity) to the collection of 
bidders that would yield the best combination of revenue maximization while main-
taining fairness and transparency of allocation. 
4.4.5.1. Experimental Design 1 – Biggest Contract Allocation 
The first allocation mechanism experimental design is biggest net present value con-
tract allocation. Here, in principle, the auction design uses a straightforward alloca-
tion rule: Award the auction item (i.e. pipeline capacity) to the highest value bid 
(measured in EUR value of the contract value on a net present value basis) until no 
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further bid fits within the capacity limits of the Nabucco pipeline (i.e. 31 bcm per 
year). 
This means that the ranking of the bids is done per net present value which for each 
individual bid is calculated as per the following formula: 
 
with 
Revt … the Total Revenue resulting from Tariff times Volume in every year t; 
r … the discount rate set at 10%. 
Note: That it is assumed that each bidder books the total pipeline distance. 
This experimental design follows the ideas of general auction theory where in an 
English Auction setting (Stockholm Nobel Price Announcement, 2002) the highest 
bidder auction participant gets awarded.   
4.4.5.2. Experimental Design 2 – Pro Rata Allocation 
The next allocation mechanism experimental design is pro rata allocation. In this 
case, the auction design – in the presence of an overbooking – utilizes the allocation 
rule of awarding the auction item (i.e. pipeline capacity) to each bidder on a pro rata 
basis (i.e. if a bidder bids for an annual maximum capacity of x bcm, the total annual 
maximum bids accumulate to y bcm, and the pipeline has a capacity of 31 bcm, the 
specific bidder gets a capacity of his/her period bid times 31 divided by y bcm allo-
cated).  
This means that in fact every bidder is awarded a piece of the auctioned pipeline ca-
pacity. In this sense this allocation mechanism is in line with the European Union en-
ergy policy aim to reach non-discriminatory access to pipeline infrastructure for third 
party shippers (EU Gas Directive, 2003; EU Gas Regulation, 2005; Cremer & Gasmi 
& Laffont, 2003). Specifically, under this allocation mechanism each bidder is allo-
cated a capacity according to the following formula in each period t: 
 
 
 
 
with 
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bidvolumebidderi … the bid volume of bidder I in a specific year t; 
maxcapacity … the capacity constraint of 31 bcm of the pipeline per year. 
4.4.5.3. Experimental Design 3 – Allocation per Optimization 
The third allocation mechanism experimental design implements an allocation per 
optimization. In this design, the allocation imperative is to award the auctioned 
Nabucco pipeline transportation capacity to the collection of bids that would yield the 
highest total revenue for the auctioneer. In detail, the following allocation procedure 
applies: 
First each bidder bids for a volume transported (v) and a particular year when the gas 
is to be transported (t). The distance of the pipeline is not considered as it does not 
affect the allocation mechanism since the constraint is on the way of the pipeline (i.e. 
you just lose on the way). 
 
Next, the items are awarded to the collection of bids that would yield the highest total 
revenue: An optimization operations research algorithm is checking and comparing 
all possible combinations of bids until an optimum solution with the highest total 
revenue is filtered out. Therefore, we solve the following allocation problem: 
 
 
so that: 
 
 
which represents the capacity constraint of 31 bcm of the Nabucco pipeline per year. 
This experimental design is inspired by the very first research on auctions – in fact 
the very first academic paper (Friedman, 1956 & 1957) on auctions presents a deci-
sion theory model in the area of operations research (Rothkopf, 2007; Myerson, 
1981) – and incorporates the operations research idea of optimization. 
 
. 
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4.5. Results 
Results show that the Nabucco auction design, in its full complexity, is a sequential 
(non-binding, binding, shareholder shipper/non-shareholder shipper), three-
dimensional/multi-attribute (distance, flow rate, years, note: tariff is fixed), and partly 
first price (i.e. first revenue) auction, with multiple winners. Similar to a Walrasian 
auction the tariff charged is the one that is concluded when supply and demand bal-
ance. For deciding on the optimal auction design for determining the most beneficial 
set of auction winners three different allocation design mechanisms are proposed. 
Rather than focusing on the full complexity of the auction framework, the proposed 
auction designs are evaluated according to the main strategic objections and per-
formance measures as outlined in Section 4.1.  
Results regarding the first allocation mechanism experimental design – biggest net 
present value contract allocation – in Figure 4 show that according to this experimen-
tal design a limited revenue raising potential/efficiency and limited fairness of allocat-
ing bidders can be observed, while transparency is given. Figure 4 illustrates graphi-
cally that by this allocation mechanism clearly the pipeline capacity of 31 bcm per 
year is not reached at all by the proposed auction. More specifically, the revenue effi-
ciency reaches a maximum of 84% (in the years 4 to 20) and reaches a modest av-
erage of 73%. By that – and assuming a pipeline tariff of EUR 78.70 (see Pickl & 
Wirl, 2010) per 1.000 m3/year – a total revenue of on average mEUR 656  per year 
or bEUR 16.4  over 25 years, that theoretically would be possible if the pipeline was 
fully utilized – is not realised. These results best illustrate the potentially detrimental 
outcomes of auctions for divisible goods (Wilson, 1979). Furthermore, fairness in 
terms of allocating bidders cannot be observed: Firstly, only four (AlphaGas, BurnNG, 
CaspGas, and DistriGas) of the 17 bidders are allocated/awarded. Hence a portfolio 
efficiency of modest 0.24 can be observed. Thirdly, clearly the big bids (and hence 
the big companies) are favored by this allocation mechanism.  
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Figure 4: Biggest Net Present Value Contract Allocation – Selected Bidders and Resulting Pipeline 
Usage Results. 
Results with regards to the second allocation mechanism experimental design – pro 
rata allocation – are summarized in Figure 5. It is shown that this experimental de-
sign yields comparable outcomes in terms of revenue raising potential/efficiency and 
transparency, but better results of fairness of allocating bidders when compared to 
the first allocation mechanism. In particular, the revenue efficiency reaches a higher 
maximum of 96% (in the year 5), but a lower average revenue efficiency of only 70%. 
This results in – assuming the same pipeline tariff of EUR 78.70 (see Pickl & Wirl, 
2010) per 1.000 m3/year – a total revenue inefficiency of on average mEUR 740  per 
year or bEUR 18.5 over 25 years.  
On the other hand, in terms of fairness of allocating bidders major improvements can 
be determined: First of all, the total portfolio size of awarded bidders reaches 17 
(meaning that all bidders get a share of the auctioned pipeline transportation capac-
ity). This translates to an optimum portfolio efficiency of 1. Finally, as every bidder 
gets allocated by this allocation mechanism, no discrimination of any particular bidder 
group with regards to any specific bidder group characteristic can be observed. 
Transparency of allocation is equally present as under the first auction design. 
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Figure 5: Pro Rata Allocation – Selected Bidders and Resulting Pipeline Usage Results. 
Results regarding the third allocation mechanism experimental design – allocation 
per optimization – are presented in Figure 6. From the graphical representation it be-
comes clear that this experimental design yields by far the best outcomes in terms of 
revenue raising potential/efficiency of all allocation mechanisms: Specifically, the 
revenue efficiency reaches the maximum of 100% in 6 years (i.e. in year 8 to 13) and 
a superior average revenue efficiency of 88%. This results in – assuming the same 
pipeline tariff of EUR 78.70 (see Pickl & Wirl, 2010) per 1.000 m3/year – a total reve-
nue inefficiency of on average mEUR 288 per year or bEUR 7.2 over 25 years, in fact 
coming as close as possible to the theoretical optimum.  
In terms of fairness of allocating bidders the allocation per optimization mechanism 
fairs far better than the biggest contract allocation mechanisms, but in contrast to the 
pro rata allocation not all bidders get awarded. In detail, the total portfolio size of 
awarded bidders reaches 10 (i.e. NatGas, PortGas, AlphaGas, JGas, GasTrad, Fin-
Gas, Q-Gas, DistriGas, CaspGas, and MiddleEuGas) of the 17 bidders. This repre-
sents a portfolio efficiency of 0.59. Finally, no discrimination of any particular bidder 
group with regards to any specific bidder group characteristic can be observed. On 
the other hand, this allocation mechanism does not allow for bidders to act strategi-
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cally as an optimum bidders’ strategy for becoming allocated can not be pre-
analysed at all as true transparency is given, but not easily assessed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Allocation per Optimization – Selected Bidders and Resulting Pipeline Usage Results. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This paper comes as a response to the many gas transportation pipeline projects 
currently under way which, to obtain financing by banks, often run special forms of 
auctions. In these auction processes potential shippers express their interest in pro-
ject participation and make firm bookings for pipeline transportation capacities. 
This paper is inspired by on the one hand the general emergence of auctions (Klem-
perer, 2004; Milgrom, 2004) and on the other by their associated properties that can 
lead to different outcomes and make the choice of auction rules a decisive challenge 
(Ockenfels, 2009). Specifically this paper tested three different allocation mechanism 
designs: i) biggest net present value contract allocation; ii) pro rata allocation; and iii) 
allocation per optimization in order to determine an optimal auction design consider-
ing particular defined auction objectives.  
The results of experimentally testing these auction designs with the bid volume pat-
terns of an empirical market survey show that the different auction design allocation 
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mechanisms demonstrate diverging trends. Table 2 summarizes the findings: a trade-
off between revenue optimization (i.e. in the interest of the pipeline owner) and fair 
and transparent allocation design (i.e. wished for by regulators to achieve third party 
access and competition) can be observed. Results show that: (i) biggest net present 
value contract allocation yields weak outcomes in terms of both pipeline revenue 
raising potential and fairness of allocation. Only transparency is satisfactorily main-
tained in this design; (ii) pro rata allocation yields optimal fairness of bidder allocation 
and transparency and comparable results in terms of revenue raising potential as 
biggest net present value contract allocation: and (iii) allocation per optimization by 
far leads to the best results in terms of revenue maximization, and improvements of a 
fair allocation compared to the biggest net present value contract allocation. On the 
other hand, transparency of allocation is found to be insignificant as this allocation 
mechanism does not allow for bidders to act strategically as an optimum bidders’ 
strategy for becoming allocated can not easily be pre-analysed. In conclusion, alloca-
tion per optimization is the favourable auction design when revenue maximization is 
more important than fair / transparent allocation. On the other hand, pro rata alloca-
tion is the auction design to be chosen when fairness and transparency of allocation 
dominates pure revenue raising potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of Results and Conclusion - The choice of auction design has implications and 
trade-offs. 
As a limitation it shall be mentioned that this auction design paper assumes that the 
choice of the auction allocation design does not impact the strategic bidding behavior 
of the bidding shippers. In fact, it is implied that all bidders bid according to the opti-
mal strategy outlined in Section 4.3. and that this results in the received bids as out-
lined in Section 4.4.. In future research, however, it shall be investigated how the ac-
tual choice of the auction allocation design impacts the strategic bidding behavior of 
bidders. 
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Earlier research has shown that Nabucco could become the term associated with 
one of the most successful energy projects in Europe (Pickl & Wirl, 2010). Carefully 
designing its auction design can additionally contribute to making this happen. In fu-
ture research the real life Nabucco Capacity Auction will be carried out and the re-
sults of its auction design presented to the energy research community. 
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6. Annexes 
6.1. Dissertation Summary in German Language 
Diese Dissertationsschrift trägt den Titel “Internationale Energiemärkte – Empirische 
Erhebungen” und beinhaltet drei von Experten begutachtete Publikationen in interna-
tionalen Zeitschriften (plus zusätzlich drei Konferenz Proceedings / Präsentationen 
und ein Buchkapitelbeitrag). Den gemeinsame Rahmen dieser drei separaten Werke 
bilden jeweils Energiemärkte und empirische Methoden, welche in jedem der Beiträ-
ge behandelt werden bzw. zur Anwendung kommen. 
 
Der erste Beitrag analysiert die Auswirkungen der Einführung einer täglichen Öko-
stromzuweisung durch die Ökostromabwicklungsstelle OEMAG und dem Anfang des 
täglichen Handels an der deutschen Strombörse EEX auf den österreichischen 
Strommarkt. Diese beiden Änderungen im Bereich des Energiehandels werden als 
natürliche Experimente unter Zuhilfenahme von statistischen und ökonometrischen 
Methoden und anhand eines speziellen Datenbestands auf folgende Auswirkungen 
untersucht: (i) eine Reduktion der Ökostromprognoseungenauigkeit; (ii) einen im All-
gemeinen effizienteren Strommarkt mit niedrigeren Ausgleichsenergiekosten. Weiters 
untersuchen wir, ob (iii) 7-Tage-Handel den Freitag-Montag-Effekt, welcher oft an 
Aktienmärkten oder anderen Börsen beobachtet wurde, verringert. Schlussendlich 
wird analysiert, ob (iv) das neue Marktdesign die Ökostromabwicklungsstelle OE-
MAG dazu verleitet, Ökostromaufkommensprognosen systematisch zu positiv anzu-
setzen. Ergebnisse zeigen, dass diese neuen Marktdesigns die Ökostromprogno-
seungenauigkeit verringern und dabei auch zu niedrigeren Ausgleichsenergiekosten 
führen. Freitag-Montag-Effekte werden etwas reduziert und vermindern dadurch die 
Volatilität an Strombörsen. Abschließend setzt die Ökostromabwicklungsstelle OE-
MAG Ökostromaufkommensprognosen im Vergleich zu tatsächlichen Ökostrompro-
duktionsaufkommen systematisch zu niedrig an. 
 
Die zweite Publikation analysiert das Nabucco Gas Pipeline Projekt – von manchen 
als kosteneffizienteste Verbindung zu neuem Gas bezeichnet – um festzustellen, ob 
es für die Europäische Union zur kosteneffizienten Diversifizierung Ihrer Gaslieferun-
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gen führt und dadurch deren Energieversorgungssicherheit in Zukunft verbessert. 
Weiters wird der Nabucco Open Season Kapazitätsallokationsprozess vorgestellt. 
Durch die Anwendung von empirischen Methoden und Benchmarking werden drei 
Hypothesen evaluiert: Während sich Hypothese (1) auf die Nachfrage für Nabucco 
Pipeline-Kapazitäten konzentriert, untersuchen Hypothese (2) faire Nutzungsrechte 
und Hypothese (3) Kosteneffizienz des Projekts. Empirische Ergebnisse veranschau-
lichen, dass der steigende Bedarf an Gas und die sinkende Eigenproduktion eine 
neue Gasleitung für Europa notwendig machen. Die empirische Studie zeigt, dass 
die Kapazitäten der Nabucco Gasleitung von Gasunternehmen stark nachgefragt 
werden, und dass Nabucco faire Nutzungsrechte von 50% der Kapazitäten für Dritt-
firmen anbietet. Schließlich untermauert die Benchmarkinganalyse, dass Nabucco 
tatsächlich eine kosteneffiziente Gasleitung und Verbindung zu neuem Gas für Euro-
pa darstellt. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen bleibt zu hoffen, dass Nabucco nicht 
nur eine berühmte Oper bleibt, sondern zu einem der erfolgreichsten Energieprojekte 
für Europa wird. 
Schlussendlich analysiert der dritte Artikel das optimale Design einer Auktion für 
Gas-Pipeline-Transportkapazitäten. Als Folge russischer Gaslieferdominanz, stei-
gender Gasnachfrage und sinkender Eigenproduktion Europas sind derzeit eine Viel-
zahl an Gaspipelineprojekten in Planung. Zur Finanzierung dieser Projekte werden 
oftmals spezielle Auktionsformen verwendet. Auktionen haben sich in jüngster Zeit 
zu den erfolgreichsten mikroökonomischen Allokationsmechanismen entwickelt. 
Durch eine Kombination von mathematischer Formulierung, experimenteller Überprü-
fung und empirischer Auktionsstudie wird das optimale Auktionsdesign für Gas Pipe-
line Transportkapazitäten anhand alternativer Vorschläge untersucht. Ergebnisse 
zeigen Trade-Offs zwischen Umsatzoptimierung und fairer bzw. transparenter Alloka-
tion: So ist „Allocation per Optimization” das bevorzugte Auktionsdesign wenn Um-
satzmaximierung am Wichtigsten ist. Andererseits scheint „Pro Rata Allocation“ das 
optimale Auktionsdesign in Bezug auf Fairness und Transparenzmaximierung zu 
sein.  
Zusätzlich zu den begutachteten Publikationen in internationalen Zeitschriften wur-
den diese drei Beiträge zur weiteren Wissensdissemination auch auf internationale 
Forschungskonferenzen präsentiert. Ein extra Buchkapitelbeitrag (in diesem Annex 
enthalten) untermauert zudem die Forschungsaktivitäten des Autors. 
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Overview 
The Friday-Monday effect in stock and other exchange markets is a well documented phenomon linked to the interruption of 
the usual flow of information during weekends. In the case of electricity markets this information break is of particular 
concern for day ahead trading auctions. The reasons are that weather forecasts become increasingly unreliable with the 
forecast horizon (three days on any Friday in a 5-days trading regime) but are crucial to predict demand and even more crucial 
renewables (e.g., wind energy). In the beginning of October 2008 the seven-day electricity trading mechanism was introduced 
on the European Energy Exchange to create a more efficient continuous market that offers trading participants the possibility 
of enhanced portfolio optimization.  Simultaneously the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) decided to 
allocate green electricity production forecasts on a daily basis to reduce prediction uncertainties which were rising recently 
due to the growing wind power generation share. This institutional change provides a unique a real world experiment how 
continuous trading enhances the efficiency of markets in particular of electricity markets. Of course these efficiency gains 
must be weighed against the costs of setting up and running trading all 7 days.  
More precisely, this paper analyses the impact of the newly introduced 7-day electricity trading mechanism on the Austrian 
renewable electricity market. Specifically, it is investigated whether the daily trading on electricity exchanges, like the German 
EEX, and the daily green electricity allocation by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG), as envisioned, 
indeed lead to (i) a reduction of the green electricity production forecasting uncertainties and (ii) a generally more efficient 
electricity market with accompanying lower costs. Furthermore, we analyse whether (iii) 7-day-trading helps to mitigate the 
Monday effect that is often observed on exchanges. Finally, we investigate whether or not (iv) the underlying market design 
might tempt OEMAG to systematically increase  its forecasts on green power generation, because its remuneration exceeds the 
costs of buying any shortfall in the market.  
 
Methods 
The decisions to trade electricity and allocate green electricity production daily from Monday to Sunday, rather than only from 
Monday to Friday serve as an excellent natural experiment that allows us to analyse the impacts of an exogenous variation in 
market settings on the Austrian renewable electricity market. That is, as has become popular in energy research, some kind of 
event study is applied.  
The analysis is performed by applying statistical and econometric methods in SPSS to a unique data set containing time series 
of green power allocation from “other renewables” (not “small hydro”) balancing deviation and balancing prices in the APG 
control area of eastern Austria. Additionally, we use data from the European Energy Exchange to analyse electricity prices. 
The period analysed comprises the six months from October 2008 to March 2009.  
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Results 
Preliminary results tend to confirm expected outcomes: Firstly, results show that the new market design reduces forecasting 
uncertainties by 26.27% (highly significant) and, secondly, on average also lowers costs of electricity balancing (highly 
significant). Whether this improved efficiency is covering the incremental costs of seven- instead of five-day trading and 
whether smaller energy exchanges, like the Austrian EXAA, are likely to make the same move remains to be investigated. 
Furthermore, seven-day trading seems to have a positive effect (even if not statistically significant) on mitigating the Friday-
Monday effects on energy exchanges, thus decreasing price volatility on power exchanges. Lastly, the new market design 
makes the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency systematically understate its forecasts on green power generation 
(highly significant) versus actual green power production. However, even here the new market design narrowed downed the 
negative forecasting tendency when compared to the results of the previous market mechanism. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion the new market mechanism of 7-day electricity trading seems to improve availability of renewable electricity 
(and presumably also demand) which should make the market more efficient: At least the three hypothesis as envisioned 
appear to point into this direction. Whether this improved efficiency is covering the incremental costs of 7- instead of 5-day 
trading and whether smaller energy exchanges, like the Austrian EXAA, are likely to make the same move, remains to be 
investigated. 
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ENHANCING THE EU’s ENERGY SUPPLY SECURITY –  
AN EVALUATION OF THE NABUCCO PROJECT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS 
OPEN SEASON CAPACITY ALLOCATION PROCESS    
 1
 
Overview 
The Russian monopolistic dominance of the European Union’s natural gas supplies has put the independence of the 
EU foreign policy at risk (Schaffer, 2008). Currently roughly a third of European Union gas uses comes through 
Kremlin-controlled east-west pipelines (The Economist, 2009) and some sources even reckon that half of all the gas 
the EU imports come from Russia (Von Hirschhausen & Meinhart & Pavel, 2005). Thus Europe may in many 
respects be seen as a captive market, largely dependent on pipeline supply from Russia (European Gas, 2007). In 
addition, the Kremlin has in recent years several times abruptly cut off gas deliveries after disputes with transit 
countries such as Ukraine. This is quite scaring considering that eighty percent of natural gas from Russia travels to 
Europe through Ukraine (Freifeld, 2009). This paper shall give an introduction to and overview of the Nabucco 
project – by some named the most economic link to new gas (RWE, 2009) and even baptised the project of the 
century (Ozkan, 2009) – which might potentially enhance the EU’s energy supply security, one of the top three 
priorities within the EU (Percebois, 2008), in future years. Furthermore, an introduction to the Nabucco Open 
Season Capacity Allocation Process is given. 
Applying empirical methods and competitive benchmarking analysis four hypotheses related to the Nabucco natural 
experiment are evaluated: while hypotheses (1) and (2) focus on the strength of demand for the Nabucco pipeline, 
hypotheses (3) and (4) examine fair usage rights and overall cost effectiveness of this project. 
Hypothesis 1: A new gas pipeline enhances the European Union supply security for natural gas. 
Hypothesis 2:  The Nabucco gas pipeline capacity is strongly demanded by gas shippers. 
Hypothesis 3: The Nabucco gas pipeline provides a fair capacity allocation for third party shippers. 
Hypothesis 4: The Nabucco gas pipeline is a cost effective way to bring new gas to Europe. 
 
Methods 
The research methods applied in this paper are manifold. In fact a combination of natural experiment setting, public 
data analysis, competitive benchmarking and empirical market survey are applied. First, the Nabucco project itself 
serves as an excellent natural experiment (Meyer, 1995) that allows us to analyse the four key hypotheses outlined 
in the previous section. As has become popular in energy research (Pickl & Wagner & Wirl, 2009; Wu & Lampietti 
& Meyer, 2004; Asche & Osmundsen & Sandsmark, 2006; Douglas, 2006; Florio, 2007; Bellas & Lange, 2008), an 
event study is carried out.  Furthermore, publicly available data from different companies’ web sites and other 
public sources is collected. This data is then analysed using competitive benchmarking (e.g. between the different 
pipeline projects that are currently in the planning stage). Finally, an empirical market survey is conducted with 54 
potential gas shippers. By inquiring their potential gas supply and demand in future years, inferences regarding the 
expected Nabucco pipeline capacity utilization – and hence overall necessity for the Nabucco pipeline for Europe – 
can be drawn. This empirical market survey serves as an important input factor for the upcoming Nabucco open 
season capacity allocation process. 
 
Results 
Four main research questions are posed centering on the strength of demand for the Nabucco pipeline (H1 and H2), 
fair access rights (H3) and overall cost effectiveness (H4). Initial results show that all four hypotheses 
encouragingly point into the envisioned direction: Increasing gas demand and decreasing indigenous production 
make a new gas pipeline necessary for Europe (H1). Next, the empirical survey demonstrated that the Nabucco gas 
pipeline is strongly demanded by gas shippers (H2). Furthermore, through its open season capacity allocation 
process, the empirical survey revealed that Nabucco provides a fair capacity allocation of fifty percent to third party 
shippers – that is also utilized – thus enhancing competition. Finally, competitive benchmarking showed that 
Nabucco is fact the most cost effective pipeline (H4). Indeed, it is the so far missing link and most economic 
connection to new gas for Europe (BP Statistical Review, 2006; RWE, 2009).  
 
  2
Conclusions 
Based on these results it can be hoped for that Nabucco will not only remain a famous opera, but turns into one of 
the most successful energy projects for Europe. Already previous research showed that the “great natural gas 
pipeline game” can be won (Schaffer, 2008), but only by acting with rapid commitment. It shall be hoped that 
commerce is not taking back seat to politics (Freifeld, 2009). However, this possible success will still require a lot 
of work and commitment from the actual participants and Europe itself with strong multilateral direction (Weisser, 
2007). Political support already in place in form of the Inter-Governmental Agreements – signed in Ankara on July 
13th 2009 – between the governments of the Nabucco transit countries (IGA, 2009) seem a good start into the right 
direction to harmonize the legal framework by granting stable and equal transport conditions for all partners and 
customers. Now that there is an agreement in place, “this pipeline is inevitable rather than just probable”, as 
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso put it in July this year (Freifeld, 2009). 
In further research the results of the actual open season capacity allocation process shall be analysed in detail. The 
undertaken empirical market survey presented here serves as an important input factor for the Nabucco open season 
capacity allocation process to be carried in the third and fourth quarter of 2010. 
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Overview 
As a response to the Russian dominance of the European Union’s natural gas supplies, major gas 
transportation pipeline projects are currently under way [1] in order to enhance the EU’s energy 
supply security, one of the top three priorities within the EU [2], in future years. Rather than 
buying and selling gas itself, many gas pipeline companies are set up as pure midstream gas 
players: they develop and construct pipelines, and as a requirement to obtain financing, rent 
transportation capacities on long- and short-term basis to interested shippers. In order to allocate 
gas transportation capacities special forms of auctions are carried out to allow potential shippers 
to express their interest in project participation and to make firm bookings. In recent years, 
auctions have emerged as one of them most successful allocation mechanisms in microeconomic 
theory and game theory. From an economic perspective, auctions are an appropriate mechanism 
for allocation as they tend to be beneficial with regards to distributional and efficiency goals [3 
and 4]. However, different auction designs and allocation mechanisms can lead to different 
outcomes. Therefore the choice of auction rules is a decisive one [5]. This paper shall give a 
mathematical formulation of an optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. 
Furthermore, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project – considered by some to be the most economical 
link to new natural gas sources – is taken as case study to experimentally and empirically show 
the results of such auction design. 
Methods 
The research methods applied in this paper are manifold. In fact, a combination of empirical 
market survey of auction volumes and bid patterns, mathematical formulation of allocation 
mechanism design and experimental testing of auction allocation is carried out. 
First, potentially optimal auction designs are mathematically formulated to achieve its strategic 
goals. In this way this paper follows eminent auction theory papers such as [6, 7, 8, and 9]. In the 
course of doing so different allocation mechanism designs are proposed. 
Next, an empirical market survey is conducted with 54 potential gas shippers to investigate the 
expected auction volumes and bid volume patterns. More specifically, the 54 most likely 
Nabucco gas shippers (focusing on company size and regional market focus) were selected from 
a customer-relationship-management (CRM) software. Contacted shippers include the six 
Nabucco shareholder shippers and the biggest gas companies within the specific Nabucco 
regional market focus. Subsequently, the market survey participants were contacted in the period 
2008 to 2009 per postal letter including a project introduction and a written questionnaire. Out of 
these 54 potential Nabucco gas shippers, 21 provided a response whereof 17 furnished 
sufficiently concrete answers to be included in the evaluation of the auction volumes and bid 
patterns.  
Finally, the different proposed allocation designs are experimentally tested using the auction 
volumes and bid patterns outcomes of the empirical market survey. That is, we use the test bed 
approach of experimental economics. The use of laboratory as a test bed for complex auctions in 
complex environments began with [10, 11, 12, and 13]. The outcomes are evaluated on two 
grounds: revenue raising potential and fairness. This experimental testing serves as an important 
input factor for the upcoming Nabucco Capacity Auction and resembles a real life auction 
application as in [14] and [15].  
Results 
Results show that the Nabucco auction design is a sequential (non-binding, binding, shareholder 
shipper / non-shareholder shipper), four-dimensional/multi-attribute (tariff, distance, flow rate, 
years), and partly first price (i.e. first revenue) auction, with multiple winners. Similar to a 
Walrasian auction the tariff charged is the one that is concluded when supply and demand 
balance. The optimal auction design for determining the most beneficial set of auction winners is 
selected based on four different allocation design mechanisms. Preliminary results show that (i) 
allocation based on “highest individual revenue” yields the weakest outcomes in terms of both 
total pipeline revenue raising potential and fairness. Second (ii) allocation based on a mixture of 
first assigning “highest individual revenue” bids combined with after a certain cap assigning 
“lowest individual revenue” bids reaches more favourable outcomes on both evaluation criteria 
than (i). Pure “optimization” (iii) leads to the best results in terms of revenue maximization, but 
falls short of a fair and transparent allocation design. Finally, “pro rata” allocation outcomes (iv) 
have an advantage of transparency and simplicity and can result in efficient allocation in the case 
of truth revealing bidders. However, strategic players under certain incentives might submit not 
truth revealing bids, and this case is still under evaluation. 
Conclusion 
This paper shows that different auction designs and allocation mechanisms can lead to different 
outcomes therefore making the choice of auction rules a decisive one. Clearly a trade-off between 
revenue maximization (i.e. in the interest of the pipeline owner) and fair and transparent 
allocation design (i.e. wished for by regulators to achieve third party access and competition) can 
be observed. In future research the real life Nabucco Capacity Auction will be carried out and the 
results of its auction design presented and analysed. 
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Abstract 
With the long-term market outlook for increased global gas demand, major gas pipeline projects are 
planned for the future in order to enhance the security of energy supplies around the world. In fact an 
estimated 140 billion USD are predicted to be spent on pipeline construction in the period 2010 to 2012 as 
world gas demand is expected to grow 1.5%-2.0% per year through 2030. 
Gas pipeline projects are predominantly regulated natural monopolies and as a result are generally subject 
to regulatory oversight. At the same time as the process of liberalization of global energy markets 
progresses, cost effectiveness of these often competing pipeline projects is crucial in order to provide 
competitive transport tariffs for potential shippers. 
This chapter presents a new methodological framework for defining cost effectiveness of international gas 
pipeline projects. The proposed methodological framework improves to fulfill the goal of cost 
effectiveness by linking cost to the length of pipelines. 
The proposed methodological framework is then applied to actual data. The major pipeline projects 
currently under way are benchmarked against each other. The developed framework makes a comparison 
of these gas pipeline projects possible based on publicly-available information on gas supplies, gas 
markets, transportation capacities, pipeline length, and capital expenditures and provides for a like-for-like 
quantitative comparison. In this way a benchmark for defining cost-effectiveness of any international 
pipeline project is determined. This will assist in evaluating cost effectiveness of international gas pipeline 
projects and will further pave the way for natural gas to become the major bridge energy source of the 
near future. 
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1. Introduction 
As a consequence of the long-term market outlook for increased global gas demand (Bothe & Lochner, 
2008; Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2007; OME, 2006), a plethora of gas pipeline projects are at various stages of 
planning. Investments in pipeline construction in the period of 2010-2012 are estimated at 140 billion 
USD (see Figure 1). This increased interest in pipeline development raises the important question of how 
to determine or estimate cost-effectiveness of international gas pipeline projects. Indeed, as the 
liberalization process of global energy markets progresses forward, one of the main determining factors in 
the outcome of competition between some pipeline projects (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2008; Cremer & Gasmi & 
Laffont, 2003) is projects’ transport tariffs cost-effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimated USD 140 billion pipeline investment - Period 2010 to 2012 (European Gas 
Conference, 2010) 
In Europe this development is even more severe: On the one hand the growth in demand for natural gas is 
expected to continue in the next 20 to 25 years (BCG, 2005). As can be seen in Figure 2 (left), European 
gas consumption will grow – largely due to increased gas-fired power generation (Bothe & Lochner, 
2008; Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2007) – from approximately 500 bcm in 2005, valued at about USD 100 
billion (Schaffer, 2008), to about 816 bcm in 2030 (OME, 2006). This translates to an average growth rate 
of 2% per annum.1 On the other hand, as the indigenous gas production of the European Union declines 
(BCG, 2005), a growing gap between gas production and gas demand (see right side of Figure 2) – can be 
                                                     
1 Latest estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009) partly update these 
demand estimates due to the general economic downturn to a European Union gas demand of about 619 bcm in 
2030. However, the general trend for strong growth in gas demand remains. 
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expected in the coming years (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008). This stems from the fact that, at its 
present rate of consumption, the EU has only a ten-year supply of natural gas within its own borders, 
making imports of natural gas a necessity (Schaffer, 2008). Thus, increasing gas demands on the one hand 
paired with decreasing EU production on the other makes a strong case for investing in new pipeline 
infrastructure (Lise & Hobbs & Oostvoorn, 2008; Finon & Locatelli, 2008; Mavrakis & Thomaidis & 
Ntroukas, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Left: Forecast of Gas Supply Europe (OME, 2006) 
 Right: Forecast of EU Gas Production Decline (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008) 
In Europe, the major playing field for new pipelines is the so-called Southern Corridor to the gas rich 
Caspian regions. Here, the main gas pipeline projects include Nabucco, South Stream, Interconnector 
Greece-Italy (IGI) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). These projects may be considered as the missing 
link between vast sources of gas and potential gas consuming markets (BP Statistical Review, 2006). The 
Caspian Region, the Middle East and Egypt, which hold the world’s largest gas reserves, play a crucial 
role in terms of diversification of supply as well as security of supply for Europe (Mavrakis & Thomaidis 
& Ntroukas, 2006). The opening up of a fourth main supply corridor2 – might be considered as one 
solution to meet future EU gas demands (BCG, 2005). As such, these projects might provide a promising 
beginning for enhancing EU’s energy supply security in future years (Schaffer, 2008). These Southern 
Corridor pipelines (for a geographical overview please refer to Figure 3) – together with the Nord Stream 
project – will be utilized to develop a new methodological benchmark framework for assessing cost-
effectiveness for gas pipeline development projects. 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 At present, there are three main sources of gas for the European Union: Russia, Norway, and Algeria (BP Statistical 
Review, 2007; Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2007) 
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Figure 3: Major Gas Pipeline Development Projects under Development (BBC, 2009 with own depiction 
of IGI and TAP) 
It is widely accepted that the main reason for the battle over pipeline transit routes (American Chronicle, 
2009) is the Russian monopolistic dominance of the European Union’s natural gas supplies that has put 
the independence of the EU foreign policy at risk (Schaffer, 2008). Currently, roughly a third of the 
natural gas consumed by the European Union is delivered through the Russian-controlled east-west 
pipelines (The Economist, 2009); some sources even surmise that half of all the gas the EU imports comes 
from Russia (Von Hirschhausen & Meinhart & Pavel, 2005; The Economist, 2007). Thus the EU may, in 
many respects, be seen as a captive market, largely dependent on Russian gas supplies (European Gas, 
2007). In recent years, the Kremlin has abruptly cut off gas deliveries several times after disputes with 
transit countries such as Ukraine. This is quite alarming considering that eighty percent of natural gas 
travelling from Russia to the EU passes through Ukraine (Freifeld, 2009). The new pipeline projects might 
potentially enhance the EU’s energy supply security, one of the top three priorities within the EU 
(Percebois, 2008). This chapter then also provides a new framework for determining the cost-effectiveness 
of international gas pipeline projects in doing so. 
Section 2 of this chapter describes the applied research methodology and introduces the methodological 
framework for defining cost effectiveness of international gas pipeline projects. In Section 3 the 
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investigated pipelines are introduced. Section 4 presents and discusses results. Concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 5. 
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2. Method 
A new methodological framework for defining cost effectiveness of international gas pipeline projects 
will now be introduced. By establishing a competitive benchmark the term “cost-effectiveness” is defined 
in the area of international gas pipeline projects, and a cost benchmark comparison of gas pipelines is then 
made possible. In addition, the proposed methodological framework facilitates the useful linking of cost-
effectiveness by to pipeline length. 
Competitive benchmarking is established by applying the proposed methodological framework to actual 
data. The major gas pipeline projects under planning in the EU (i.e., Nabucco, South Stream, Nord Stream 
(I and II), Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)) are investigated in terms 
of cost-effectiveness – and serve as excellent natural experiments case studies (Meyer, 1995). As has 
become popular in energy research (Pickl & Wagner & Wirl, 2009; Wu & Lampietti & Meyer, 2004; 
Asche & Osmundsen & Sandsmark, 2006; Douglas, 2006; Florio, 2007; Bellas & Lange, 2008), a type of 
an event study with actual data is carried out.  
The methodological framework – inspired by a previous publication (Pickl & Wirl, 2010) but extended for 
additional pipelines – for this cost effectiveness benchmarking exercise will now be outlined in detail. 
First, the input source for this competitive benchmarking utilizes publicly available information on 
transportation capacities, pipeline length, and capital expenditures for these pipelines. Figure 4 below 
summarises these projections. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Major Gas Pipeline Projects: Capacities, Length, and Capital Expenditures (RWE, 2009; IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2009; Reuters, 2007) 
In addition, publicly available data from different companies’ web sites and other public sources are 
collected. These data are then analysed using competitive benchmarking (e.g., between the different 
pipeline projects that are currently in the planning stage). 
To create like-for-like comparisons, a common gas supply start time (i.e. beginning of 2015), a common 
utilization rate (i.e. 90%), equal relative operational expenditures (i.e. 1.5% of capital expenditures), the 
same evaluation period of 25 years, and identical financial assumptions (i.e. 100% equity financing, 
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internal rate of return requirements of 11.5%) were chosen (own industry assumptions). Furthermore, for 
Nabucco, South Stream, IGI and TAP a common gas source (i.e. Azerbaijan off-shore Caspian Sea gas) is 
assumed. For Nord Stream (I and II) this is not the case for geographical reasons (see Figure 8 in next 
Section) – its inclusion is for transport cost benchmarking purposes only. 
In the next step, to evaluate tariffs and provide for a competitive benchmarking, the following tariff cost 
functions methodology is applied: 
  
 
with Cn … Cash flows per period  so that 
 
 
 with 
Tariff2 … Total Tariff for the full pipeline distance per 1.000 m3 per year; 
PipelineCapacity … Pipeline specific as per Figure 4 above; 
CAPEX … Pipeline specific capital expenditures as per Figure 4 above; 
OPEX … Operational expenditures at 1.5% of Capital Expenditures; 
UtilizationRate … 90%; 
r … 11.5%. 
and 
 
 
with  
Tariff1 … Distance-related Tariff; 
PipelineLength … Pipeline specific pipeline length as per Figure 4 above. 
By this method a benchmark for defining cost effectiveness of any international gas pipeline project is 
determined. The next section describes the investigated pipeline projects in more detail.  
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3. Investigated Pipelines 
This section features a description of the pipelines that are included in the cost-effectiveness 
benchmarking. In general, the investigated pipelines include the major gas pipeline projects currently 
under planning in Europe – namely Nabucco, South Stream, Nord Stream (I and II), the Interconnector 
Greece-Italy (IGI) pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). All these pipelines might potentially 
enhance the EU’s energy supply security, one of the top three priorities within the EU (Percebois, 2008), 
in future years. 
These projects may be seen as the missing link between giant sources of gas and potential gas consuming 
markets (BP Statistical Review, 2006). Especially, the Caspian Region, the Middle East and Egypt, which 
hold the largest gas reserves worldwide, play a crucial role in terms of diversification of supply as well as 
security of supply for Europe (Mavrakis & Thomaidis & Ntroukas, 2006). The opening up of a fourth 
main supply corridor – next to Russia, Norway, and Algeria – might be considered as one solution to meet 
future EU gas demands (BCG, 2005). However, an important criterion for these pipelines to become 
reality is cost effectiveness. 
Figure 5 below illustrates the envisioned geographic locations of these pipeline projects. In general, the 
introduction of open access to pipeline transportation capacity has unlocked two distinctive industries: the 
natural-gas market, where agents trade natural gas as a commodity, and the market for pipeline 
transportation services, where agents trade services to ship natural gas through the pipeline networks 
(Raineri & Kuflik, 2003). This is an important concept that will contribute to a competitive European gas 
infrastructure market since former contracts were often negotiated bilaterally in non-transparent and less 
competitive manners (De Joode &  Van Oostvoorn, 2007). Following Smith, De Vany and Michaels 
(1990), the use of “Exchangable Transport Entitlements” – which gives the right to utilize, to lease, or to 
sell the pipeline capacity in a specific segment for a specific period – makes sure that the (scarce) capacity 
can be used by those who value it most, with the possibility of being resold in a secondary market (Raineri 
& Kuflik, 2003). Consequently, gas pipeline transportation becomes a property right, the gas pipeline 
becomes a transportation right supplier, and the owners of these rights offer transportation capacity 
(Walls, 1995). Subsequently each pipeline will be briefly described in a short paragraph. 
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Figure 5: Major Gas Pipeline Development Projects under Development (BBC, 2009 with own depiction 
of IGI and TAP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The Nabucco Pipeline Project (Nabucco, 2010) 
The Nabucco project, which takes its name from the Giuseppe Verdi opera that the Consortium members 
attended after their first meeting, represents a new natural gas pipeline that will begin at the eastern border 
of Turkey and will connect the Caspian Region and the Middle East via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary with Austria and further on with Central and Western Europe gas markets (Nabucco, 2010). The 
pipeline length will be approximately 3,300 km, stretching from the Georgian/Turkish and Iraqi/Turkish 
border to Baumgarten in Austria. Additional feeder pipelines are also possible (RWE, 2009). Based on 
technical market studies, the pipeline has been designed to transport a maximum amount of 31 bcm per 
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year (Nabucco, 2010). Nabucco shareholders are RWE (Germany), OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), 
Transgaz (Romania), Bulgarian Energy Holding (Bulgaria) and Botas (Turkey). Currently, each 
shareholder holds an equal share of 16.67 % (Nabucco, 2010). Estimated investment costs including 
financing costs for the complete new pipeline system amount to approximately EUR 7.9 billion (RWE, 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The South Stream Pipeline Project (South Stream, 2010) 
The South Stream pipeline project is Russia’s alternative pipeline project and by some seen as rival to the 
planned Nabucco pipeline. It will go across the Black Sea, and then through Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary 
to Austria, or alternatively through Slovenia to Italy (MacDonald, 2008) extending over approximately 
3,200 km. Project owners of this pipeline are Gazprom (Russia) and ENI (Italy). Furthermore EDF is 
expected to join this consortium in future. Based on industry information, the pipeline is planned to 
transport up to 63 bcm of gas annually. With that it is the biggest of all investigated pipeline projects. 
With costs of EUR 25 billion (American Chronicle, 2009; RWE, 2009), it is claimed to be not cost 
competitive, as according to analyst views it is too expensive (The Economist, 2009b). Moreover, as a 
Russian project it would not diversify Europe’s energy supplies away from Russia. 
Nord Stream stands for another new natural gas pipeline project that will link Russia and the European 
Union via the Baltic Sea (see Figure 8). With 2,100 km in total length – and major portions of it offshore –  
it will be, when finished, the longest sub-sea pipeline in the world. The plan for the offshore pipeline is to 
build two parallel legs (Nord Stream I and II) each with capacity of 27.5 bcm per year for a total 
transportation capacity of up to 55 billion cubic metres of gas each year. Nord Stream is a joint venture of 
five companies. Gazprom holds a 51 percent stake in the joint venture. BASF SE/Wintershall Holding and 
E.ON Ruhrgas each hold 15,5 percent, and Gasunie and GDF Suez each have a 9 percent share (Nord 
Stream, 2010).  Total pipeline costs are estimated to amount to EUR 17.0 billion (IEA World Energy 
Outlook, 2009; Reuters, 2007).  
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Figure 8: The Nord Stream Pipeline Project (Nord Stream, 2010) 
The Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) – also referred to as Poseidon project (IGI, 2010) – is a planned 
natural gas pipeline for the transportation of natural gas from the Caspian region to Italy. It is a part of the 
Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI) pipeline system starting from Karacabey (Turkey), going over 
to Komotini (Greece), and from there passing the Ionian Sea to reach Otrantro in Italy (see Figure 9). The 
IGI pipeline will extend over approximately 807 km. Its project owners – the Italian firm Edison and the 
Greek Public Gas Corporation DEPA will spend EUR 1.1 billion to transport estimated 10 bcm on an 
annual basis to Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) Pipeline Project (RWE, 2009) 
Finally, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – as per Figure 10 – is a proposed pipeline project to transport 
natural gas from the Caspian and Middle East regions starting from Thessaloniki in Greece, through 
Albania and the Adriatic Sea to its Brindisi in Italy (TAP, 2010). The project is designed for a 
transportation capacity of 10 bcm annually. The shareholders of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project 
include the Swiss EGL, the Norwegian Statoil and the German E.ON Ruhrgas. EGL and Statoil both own 
42.5% in the project, while E.ON Ruhrgas holds a 15% share. The 520 km long pipeline will cost 
estimated EUR 1.5 billion. 
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Figure 10: Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) Project (RWE, 2009) 
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4. Results 
This chapter section presents the results of the pipelines’ cost effectiveness benchmarking and hence of 
defining cost effectiveness of international gas pipeline projects. Recalling section 2, the input source for 
this competitive benchmarking is publicly available information on transportation capacities, pipeline 
length, and capital expenditures of these pipelines. Figure 11 below restates these projections in a 
summarised form:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Major Gas Pipeline Projects: Capacities, Length, and Capital Expenditures (RWE, 2009; IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2009; Reuters, 2007) 
To create like-for-like comparisons, a common gas supply start time (i.e. beginning of 2015), a common 
utilization rate (i.e. 90%), equal relative operational expenditures (i.e. 1.5% of capital expenditures), the 
same evaluation period of 25 years, and identical financial assumptions (i.e. 100% equity financing, 
internal rate of return requirements of 11.5%) were chosen (own industry assumptions). Furthermore, for 
the pipeline projects Nabucco, South Stream, IGI and TAP a common gas source (i.e. Azerbaijan off-
shore Caspian Sea gas) is assumed. For Nord Stream (I and II) this is not the case for geographical 
considerations (see Figure 8 in Section 4), its inclusion is for transport cost benchmarking purposes only. 
Next, to evaluate tariffs and provide for the competitive benchmarking and cost effectiveness evaluation, 
the tariff cost functions as outlined in Section 2 are applied: In this way a cost effectiveness benchmark for 
a distance related tariff and a total tariff is established. 
Figure 12 shows the results of this competitive benchmarking of all pipelines under review and indicates 
the cost effectiveness benchmark for a distance related tariff and for a total tariff. Computed as the 
average of all pipeline tariff cost functions the cost effectiveness benchmark comes to EUR 4,69 (per 100 
km / per 1.000 m3 / per year) for the distance related tariff and EUR 85,48 (for the full pipeline distance 
per 1.000m3 / per year) for the total tariff. A truly cost effective pipeline clearly meets both of these tariff 
benchmarks. 
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Figure 12: Major Gas Pipeline Projects: Cost Effectiveness Benchmarking 
The results show that, under the stated assumptions, the Nabucco pipeline would reach a distance related 
tariff of EUR 2,38 (per 100 km / per 1.000 m3 / per year) and a total tariff of EUR 78,70 (for the full 
pipeline distance per 1.000m3 / per year). The South Stream project would arrive at a distance related tariff 
of EUR 3,05 (per 100 km / per 1.000 m3 / per year) and a total tariff of EUR 97,59 (for the full pipeline 
distance per 1.000m3 / per year). For Nord Stream the cost function computation yield a distance related 
tariff of EUR 3,62 (per 100 km / per 1.000 m3 / per year) and a total tariff of EUR 76,01 (for the full 
pipeline distance per 1.000m3 / per year). Separate cost effectiveness results are provided for the different 
pipeline legs of Nord Stream I and II. The Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) shows a distance related tariff 
of EUR 2,90 (per 100 km / per 1.000 m3 / per year) and a total tariff of EUR 90,00 (for the full pipeline 
distance per 1.000m3 / per year). Finally, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) would have to charge a 
distance related tariff of EUR 6,20 (per 100 km / per 1.000 m3 / per year) and a total tariff of EUR 104,00 
(for the full pipeline distance per 1.000m3 / per year) to meet the like-for-like internal rate of return 
assumptions. 
So which of these pipelines meet the cost effectiveness benchmark? As stated before a fully cost effective 
pipeline clearly has to satisfy both tariff benchmarks: distance related tariff and total tariff. This is the 
benchmark for defining cost effectiveness of an international pipeline project according to this book 
chapter. Figure 13 below indicates that distance related tariff cost effectiveness is meet by 4 out of 5 
investigated pipeline projects: Nabucco, South Stream, Nord Stream and the Interconnector Greece-Italy 
(IGI) pipeline. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) fails the distance related tariff cost effectiveness 
criterion. When looking at the total tariff cost effectiveness only Nabucco and Nord Stream are cost 
effective. South Stream with costs of EUR 25 billion (American Chronicle, 2009; RWE, 2009), Russia’s 
alternative pipeline across the Black Sea, the South Stream project through Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary 
to Austria, or alternatively through Slovenia to Italy (MacDonald, 2008), will not be cost effective and 
therefore not competitive, as according to analyst views it is too expensive (The Economist, 2009b). 
Moreover, it would not diversify Europe’s energy supplies away from Russia. Also the Interconnector 
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Greece-Italy (IGI) pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) are not total tariff cost-effective. 
Therefore – when reviewing both distance related and total tariffs – only two of the major gas pipeline 
projects currently under planning in Europe are cost effective: the Nabucco project and Nord Stream. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Cost Effectiveness – Both Distance Related and Total Tariff Criterion only met by Nabucco 
and Nord Stream 
Compared to Nord Stream (I and II), Nabucco is more cost-effective on a distance-related tariff basis 
(34%, i.e. EUR 2,38 vs. EUR 3,62) and on almost equal conditions in terms of total tariff (i.e. EUR 78,70 
vs. EUR 76,01). The minor total tariff surplus comes from the fact that Nord Stream is considerably 
shorter in terms of pipeline length (2.100 km vs. 3.300 km) than Nabucco. From a strategic point of view 
for Europe it shall furthermore be mentioned that in any event, neither South Stream nor Nord Stream 
would diversify the EU’s energy supplies away from Russia.  
The only true alternative to new pipelines – increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports – seems 
unpromising. LNG with 55.3 billion cubic meters of imports into Europe in 2008 (E.ON Ruhrgas, 2009) is 
currently just providing about 10% of overall supplies. While import capacities might not be the main 
constraining factor for LNG, it will certainly not be able to shoulder the increasing gas supply 
requirements of Europe by itself. In any event, even though substantial decreases are happening, LNG is 
still more costly than piped gas at distances up to 3.000 to 4.000 kilometres (Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2007). 
Therefore, all pipelines achieving the outlined cost effectiveness benchmark of EUR 4,69 for the distance 
related tariff and EUR 85,48 for the total tariff can be named gas pipeline that transport new gas to Europe 
in a cost-effective way. In this way, a more competitive European gas market with accompanying lower 
costs can be expected. This can only benefit European consumers. 
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5. Conclusion 
A new methodological framework for assessing the cost effectiveness of international gas pipeline 
projects was presented and discussed. Market developments (i.e., increasing global gas demand, a plethora 
of pipeline projects under planning, and the thus far lack of a cost-effectiveness benchmarking 
framework) necessitate the development of such a tool to further pave the way for natural gas to become 
the major bridge energy source of the near-future. 
The proposed methodological framework for assessing the cost effectiveness of international gas pipeline 
projects includes two criteria:  i) a distance related tariff benchmark and ii) a total tariff benchmark. After 
outlining the methodological framework the tool was applied to actual data of five major pipelines under 
planning in the EU: Nabucco, South Stream, Nord Stream, the Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) pipeline 
and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). These were assessed utilizing publicly available information on 
transportation capacities, pipeline length, and capital expenditures and by creating like-for-like 
assumptions in terms of gas supply start time, gas source, utilization rates, operational expenditures, 
evaluation periods, and financial assumptions. 
The outcomes show that when considering both the distance related tariff benchmark and the total tariff 
benchmark only two of the major gas pipeline projects (the Nabucco project and Nord Stream) currently 
under planning in Europe are indeed cost effective. As the liberalization of global energy markets 
progresses, increasing pipeline-to-pipeline competition (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2008) should only result in the 
construction of cost-effective gas pipelines. It was demonstrated that  the new methodological framework 
presented here can assist in evaluating the cost effectiveness of any given international gas pipeline 
project. 
It should be noted that the current methodology does not account for accessibility and exploration costs of 
the gas supply side, which are considered to be exogenous parameters. Naturally, these parameters have 
an impact on the overall economics of any pipeline project and are needed for complete netback 
calculations (Reuters, 2010). The exclusion of these parameters from the current analysis is partially 
mitigated by assuming a common gas source for the calculations. . Nevertheless, the author hopes that the 
presented methodological framework can become the tool of choice for assessing cost-effectiveness of 
any given international gas pipeline project. 
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